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ABSTRACT 
 
Host state counterclaims in investment treaty arbitration are rarely pleaded and never 
successful, to the extent that one commentator has characterised their use as ‘thirty years of 
failure’. This paper navigates the obstacles that host states must contend with to assert 
counterclaims in investment treaty arbitration. While state counterclaims are permitted in 
principle under the ICSID Convention and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, satisfaction of the 
jurisdiction and admissibility requirements has proved more complex. The paper examines a 
number of core treaty provisions to identify the treaties that may be more or less likely to 
extend a tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione materiae over state counterclaims. Subsequently, this 
paper examines the requisite connection that must exist between a counterclaim and the 
principal claim. A survey of international jurisprudence supports the conclusion of this paper 
that recent treaty tribunal decisions have taken an unjustifiably narrow and often 
inconsistent approach to requisite connection, to the extent that it may be virtually impossible 
for states to assert counterclaims under its current articulation. This paper offers an 
alternative approach. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, non-substantive footnotes, bibliography and 
appendices) is 14,988 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
International investment arbitration is often envisaged as a form of ‘quasi-judicial review 
of state regulatory action’ whereby the respondent state is brought to task for treating a 
foreign investor in a manner that violates its treaty obligations. Host state counterclaims push 
back against this conception, and are met with formidable resistance. Infrequently brought, 
the success of host state counterclaims is rarer still and no state has yet prevailed on the 
merits of its case. It is remarkable, however, that most of the cases in which counterclaims 
have been submitted have been decided within the last five years. The nature of host state 
counterclaims is also evolving. While early counterclaims were predominantly based on a 
contract with a foreign investor, recent cases show host states asserting counterclaims on the 
basis of its own general domestic laws. The conclusion to be drawn is that host states are 
becoming more aggressive in pursuit of counterclaims against foreign investors, despite the 
fact that their efforts have not tended to be successful.  
 
This paper navigates the obstacles that host states must contend with to assert 
counterclaims in investment treaty arbitration, and critiques the reasoning of tribunals that 
have rejected to hear state counterclaims. To this end, this paper advances three substantive 
Parts. Part II provides important context to this discussion: it sets out a definition of 
counterclaims; explains the overarching purpose of international investment law and 
arbitration; and promotes the potential value that a more permissive approach to host state 
counterclaims could bring to the international investment regime.  
 
Grimly noting that the current framework has resulted in ‘thirty years of failure’, Part III 
analyses the circumstances in which host states may assert counterclaims in investment treaty 
arbitration. A study of the ICSID Convention and UNCITRAL Arbitration rules reveals that 
counterclaims are permitted in principle. In practice, however, assertion of counterclaims has 
proved more complex. This paper examines a number of core treaty provisions to identify the 
treaties that may be more or less likely to extend a tribunal’s jurisdiction over counterclaims. 
Subsequently, this paper examines the requisite connection that must exist between a 
counterclaim and the principal claim. A survey of international jurisprudence supports the 
conclusion of this paper that recent cases have taken an unjustifiably narrow and often 
inconsistent approach to requisite connection, to the extent that it may be virtually impossible 
for states to assert counterclaims under its current articulation.  
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Part V proposes an alternative approach to the assessment of requisite connection that 
better adapts the requirement to treaty-based arbitration. This paper agrees that investment 
tribunals should undertake the assessment of requisite connection in fact and in law. Unlike 
current practice, however, this paper recommends that legal connection should be satisfied 
when a counterclaim relates to the same investment as the principal claim rather than 
insisting on symmetry of the legal instruments that underlie the claims. This approach is 
likely to be more consistent with the tribunal’s jurisdiction as reflected in the relevant 
bilateral investment treaty. Crucially, this alternative approach also leaves open the 
possibility that state counterclaims may be based on the general domestic law of the host 
state. 
 
II COUNTERCLAIMS  
A A DEFINITION 
In essence, a counterclaim is a claim presented by the respondent in opposition to a claim 
advanced by the claimant (the “principal claim”) in the same proceedings.1 The nature of this 
opposition is not by way of defence but, rather, a counterclaim constitutes a new cause of 
action against the claimant.2 Counterclaims are an independent cause of action in that, once 
properly admitted, the success or failure of a counterclaim does not depend on the subsequent 
fate of the principal claim.3 At the same time, counterclaims are connected to the principal 
claim in that it must arise from the same legal and factual context. 4  The respondent’s 
objective in asserting a counterclaim is to negate or mitigate the legal consequences of the 
principal claim. 5  A simple illustration is found in purely contractual disputes: where a 
claimant alleges breach of contract, the respondent may counterclaim that the claimant is also 
in breach of that same contract. 
 
                                                     
1  Dafina Atanasova, Adrián Martínez Benoit and Josef Ostřanský “The Legal Framework for 
Counterclaims in Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2014) 31 J. Int’l Arb. 357 at 359.  
 
2  Constantine Antonopoulos Counterclaims before the International Court of Justice (T.M.C. Asser 
Press, The Hague, 2011) at 50. 
 
3  Antonopoulos. above n 2, at 10.  
 
4  Atanasova, above n 1, at 378. 
.   
5  Antonopoulos, above n 2, at 63.  
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The central rationale underlying counterclaims is procedural economy and the better 
administration of justice. Consolidation of claims and counterclaims in the same proceedings 
allows adjudicators to hear a more complete overview of the case through the respective 
claims of the parties,6 and a fully informed tribunal may be expected to reach a more just and 
rational result.7 Where the claims are sufficiently connected, separate proceedings would 
require the examination of the same evidence and written and oral arguments in different 
fora, resulting in delays and corresponding costs. There is also a risk that the different fora 
would reach inconsistent decisions.8 Hence, consolidation of claims and counterclaims not 
only promotes procedural fairness between the disputing parties and saves both parties time 
and money; it may also safeguard the coherence of the legal system as a whole.9  
 
1 DISTINGUISHED FROM A DEFENCE ON THE MERITS 
Counterclaims are not the same as defences on the merits. A defence on the merits is a 
submission formulated by the respondent that is devised to nullify the principal claim, that is, 
to render the principal claim devoid of its factual or legal basis.10 For example, a respondent 
may submit that it is not at fault for non-performance of its contractual obligations on the 
grounds of force majeure (as was successfully argued by Iran in Gould Marketing, Inc v 
Ministry of National Defense of Iran in the Iran/United States Claims Tribunal following the 
Iranian Revolution).11 Such a submission is a defence on the merits as its objective is to 
defeat the principal claim.12 
 
In contrast, a respondent submits a counterclaim to seek a judgment in its favour “further” 
or “over and above” dismissal of the principal claim.13 A counterclaim may seek judgment 
                                                     
6   Hege Elisabeth Kjos Applicable Law in Investor-State Arbitration: The Interplay Between National 
and International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) at 128. 
 
7  Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
Uganda)(Counter-Claims), Order of 21 November 2001, ICJ Rep. 2001, at 684. 
  
8  Kjos, above n 6, at 128 – 129.   
  
9  Kjos, above n 6, at 130.  
 
10  Antonopoulos, above n 2, at 60.  
 
11  Gould Marketing, Inc. v Ministry of National Defense of Iran, Interlocutory Award, 27 July 1983, 3 
Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. 146. 
  
12  Antonopoulos, above n 2, at 60.  
  
13  Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, above n 7, at 677.  
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“over and above” dismissal of the principal claim by denying the principal claim as well as 
alleging that, instead, the claimant is at fault.14 Alternatively, a counterclaim may not deny 
the principal claim at all but aim to mitigate or deprive a judgement in favour of the principal 
claim of its adverse effect. In this way, a counterclaim may serve a defensive function in a 
tactical sense, but it is not a “defence” as a term of art in the law of procedure; counterclaims 
have an “offensive” character.15 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) succinctly noted this 
distinction in the Bosnian Genocide case:16 
 
“[T]he thrust of a counterclaim is thus to widen the original subject-matter of the dispute by 
pursuing objectives other than the mere dismissal of the claim of the Applicant in the main 
proceedings.” 
 
2 DISTINGUISHED FROM A CLAIM OF SET-OFF  
Counterclaims are also distinguishable from claims of set-off, even though it is common 
that the two are referred to in the same breath. A set-off is an equitable defence that money 
owed by the claimant to the respondent should be counter-balanced against the principal 
claim.17 The primary similarity between set-off and counterclaims is that both are presented 
to avoid circuitry of action (in the case of set-off, between mutual debtors). However, there 
are distinct differences.18  
 
A counterclaim allows a respondent to raise an independent claim, and therefore the usual 
practice is that two separate judgments are ultimately issued (for claim and counterclaim).19 
                                                                                                                                                                     
  
14  For example, Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria 
(Cameroon v Nigeria) (Counter-Claims), Order of 30 June 1999, ICJ Rep. 1999, at 985: The Tribunal 
ruled that the “Counter-Memorial of Nigeria in submission 7 contains claims whereby Nigeria seeks 
further to the rejection of Cameroon’s claims to establish the latter’s responsibility and to obtain 
reparation on that account” and that “such claims constitute counterclaims within the meaning of 
Article 80 of the Rules of the Court.” [Emphasis added].  
 
15  Antonopoulos, above n 2, at 63. 
 
16  Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia) (Counterclaims), Order of 17 December 1996, ICJ 
Rep. 1997 at 256. 
  
17  S. R. Derham “The Law of Set Off: 3rd edition” (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) at 1.01. 
 
18  Christopher Kee “Set-off in International Arbitration – What Can The Asian Region Learn?” (2005) 1 
Asian International Arbitration Journal 141 at 146. 
 
19  Kee, above n 18, at 146. 
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In comparison, a set-off defence only reduces the potential amount for which the respondent 
is liable and does not allow a respondent to initiate a claim to recover in its own right. Hence, 
a demand based on a counterclaim may exceed the amount of the original claim while a set-
off demand may not. 20  Counterclaims are also broader in scope than claims of set-off: 
counterclaims are not limited to monetary claims, but may also include claims requesting 
specific performance or restitution of goods, for example.21  
 
 Unlike counterclaims, the life of a set-off is dependent on the main claim and if a 
tribunal finds against the principal claim, the set-off will not be heard.22  As Berger suggests: 
‘set-off, whether of substantive or a procedural quality, is not a device to attack but a mere 
defence of the respondent against the claimant’s claim. It can be used “as a shield, not as a 
sword”’.23 Again, the “offensive” character of counterclaims sets them apart.  
 
II INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 
A PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 
The overarching purpose of international investment law in general and investment treaty 
arbitration in particular is to encourage foreign investment. Foreign investment requires the 
long-term commitment of substantial resources by foreign investors in the territorial 
sovereignty of the host state.24 Often, investors sink significant capital into a project at the 
outset of an investment, with the expectation of recouping this amount along with an 
acceptable rate of return during the life of the investment, sometimes running up to 30 years 
or more.25 This is a risky enterprise. In addition to the commercial risks inherent to any long-
term investment, investors also face political risks in the host state. Political or sovereign risk 
is the risk that a host state will exercise public power to alter its legal landscape in a way that 
                                                                                                                                                                     
  
20  Pierre Karrer “Arbitration Saves! Costs: Poker and Hide-and-Seek” (1986) 3 Journal of International 
Arbitration 35 at 38. 
 
21  Kee, above n 18, at 146. 
 
22  Kee, above n 18, at 146. 
   
23  Klaus Peter Berger “Set-Off in International Economic Arbitration” (1999) 15 Arbitration International 
53 at 54, citing Stooke v Taylor (1880) 5 QB 569 at 575.  
 
24  Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreur Principles of International Investment Law, 2nd edition (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 20. 
 
25  Dolzer, above n 24. at 21. 
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devalues the profitability of an investment. This includes regime change, a change of general 
or sectorial economic and tax policy, and economic and political emergencies within the host 
state, to name just a few.26  
 
 International investment treaties operate to reduce the level of this political risk.27 In 
an investment treaty, the host state guarantees minimum standards of regulatory treatment to 
foreign investors beyond those in customary international law and, in doing so, deliberately 
constrains the scope of its sovereignty to regulate.28 Minimum standards take the form of 
investment treaty obligations such as a prohibition on uncompensated expropriation, fair and 
equitable treatment, national treatment, full protection and security and most-favoured-nation 
treatment.29 These obligations confer greater stability and predictability to the host state’s 
legal landscape vis-à-vis the investor to create a more investment-friendly climate.30 Hence, 
this quid pro quo weighs in the investor’s calculus of investment risks and, theoretically, 
encourages increased foreign investment in the host state.31  
 
Investment treaty obligations are enforceable against the host state at the suit of the 
investor by recourse to investment arbitration, provided for in a treaty’s dispute resolution 
clause (clause compromissoire). Arbitration is ‘a process by which parties consensually 
submit a dispute to a non-governmental decision-maker, selected by or for the parties, to 
render a binding decision resolving a dispute in accordance with neutral, adjudicatory 
procedures affording the parties an opportunity to be heard’.32 As this definition suggests, the 
appeal of arbitration has party autonomy at its heart. Parties to a dispute wield the “ultimate 
                                                     
26  Christoph Schreur “Do We Need Investment Arbitration?” in Jean E. Kalicki and Anna Joubin-Bret 
“Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System: Journeys for the 21st Century” (Brill Nihoff 
NV, Leiden, 2015) 879 at 879.  
 
27  Zachary Douglas “The International Law of Investment Claims” (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2012) at 1.  
 
28  Dolzer, above n 26, at 20. 
  
29  Douglas, above n 27, at 1 – 2. 
 
30  Dolzer, above n 25, at 22. 
  
31  Whether investment treaties do in fact encourage foreign investment is a subject of debate. For detailed 
treatment, see Sauvant and Sachs (eds) The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment (2009).  
 
32  G. Born International Arbitration: Law and Practice (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 
2012) at 1.  
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power [in] determining the form, structure, system and other details of the arbitration”.33 
Party autonomy is generally exercised to secure neutral and expert arbitrators to decide the 
dispute in a relatively informal forum.34 Ultimately, the arbitrators’ final and binding decision 
is supported by strong enforcement mechanisms at international law pursuant to the New 
York Convention35 and ICSID Convention.36 
 
In the absence of a treaty arbitration clause, foreign investors embroiled in an investment 
dispute only have recourse to diplomatic protection or the host state’s domestic courts. 
Neither of these options is ideal from the investor’s perspective. Diplomatic protection 
involves the espousal of the investor’s claim by its state of nationality, whereby the state 
pursues the claim as surrogate; a procedure designed to supplement the traditional notion that 
non-state actors do not have standing on the international plane.37 Investors must undergo the 
time and expense of exhausting local remedies before diplomatic protection may be exercised 
and, even then, it is discretionary. The investor’s state of nationality may not wish to 
politicise the dispute or may not have the means to effectively pursue the claim. It is 
unsurprising that investors are reluctant to have such little control to vindicate their legal 
rights.38 
 
Recourse to a host state’s domestic courts is also unattractive. Rightly or wrongly, the 
domestic courts of the host state are not perceived as sufficiently impartial. This is not 
necessarily because it is believed the courts will be corrupt, unreliable or openly partisan as 
such, although that is certainly true of many jurisdictions.39 Rather, there is a concern that 
                                                     
33  Julian D M Lew and others Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2003) at 6 – 7. 
 
34  Kjos, above n 6, at 22. 
 
 
35  Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (signed June 10 1958, 
entered into force 7 June 1959) (‘New York Convention’). 
 
36  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States 
(signed 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966) 575 UNTS 159 (‘ICSID Convention’).  
  
37   Schreur, above n 26, at 882. 
 
38   Schreur, above n 26, at 883.  
 
39 Schreur, above n 26, at 883, quoting Jan Paulsson “Enclaves of Justice” (2007) 4 Transnational Dispute 
Management: “[I]t would be preposterous to imagine that even half of the world’s population lives in 
countries that provide decent justice” and “[t]he rule of law is pure illusion for most of our fellow 
travellers on this planet.”  
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even the most impartial national court will show greater understanding for the plight of its 
home government than neutral and detached international arbitrators.40 Moreover, domestic 
courts are usually bound to apply local law even if it is at odds with the host state’s 
international obligations, and the sitting judges will often lack the expertise to resolve 
complex international investment disputes. 41  As there is no right without a remedy, the 
availability of investment arbitration – a far more accessible and effective option – enables 
foreign investors to bypass these difficulties, and invest more readily.  
 
B ROLE OF COUNTERCLAIMS IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 
As is evident from the preceding discussion, investment treaties can be characterised as 
an asymmetrical rubric of investor rights and host state obligations. The difficulty that this 
structure creates for the assertion of state counterclaims in arbitration is the subject of 
comprehensive review in Part III of this paper. This section aims to provide important context 
to that review by highlighting the value that a more permissive approach to state 
counterclaims could bring to investment treaty arbitration.  
 
In addition to the benefits of procedural economy and the better administration of justice, 
assertion of state counterclaims in investment treaty arbitration aligns with the purpose of 
arbitration to facilitate the resolution of disputes in a neutral forum. In the event that its 
counterclaims are not heard, states are likely to seek relief in its own courts or in another, 
contractually agreed upon, forum.42 There is irony in forcing states and investors to resolve 
disputes in domestic courts given that recourse to domestic courts is precisely what 
investment arbitration was designed to avoid.43 Moreover, fragmentation of the dispute in 
different tribunals increases the risk of inconsistent decisions, and the complex impasse of 
injunctions against parallel proceedings.44 
                                                                                                                                                                     
  
40  I. Alvik Contracting with Sovereignty (Oxford, Hart, 2011) at 44. 
  
41   Christoph Schreuer The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2010) at 5. 
  
42   Kjos, above n 6, at 130. 
 
43   Spyridon Roussalis v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/01, Dissenting Opinion of W. Michael 
Reisman at 146. 
 
44  Jean E. Kalicki “Counterclaims by States in Investment Arbitration” (14 January 2013) IISD 
Investment Treaty News <www.iisd.org.nz>.  
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The ability to counterclaim would enable states to launch an offensive, rather than merely 
a defensive. It has been said that, without such an ability, ‘a state cannot win; the most it can 
hope to do is not lose’.45 The ability to counterclaim may consequently render states more 
willing to arbitrate and deter investors from bringing weak claims. In turn, time and money is 
less likely to be spent on jurisdictional objections and cases could proceed more quickly to 
the merits.46 Once a decision is rendered, states could benefit from the superior enforcement 
mechanisms at international law, mentioned above, which are more readily enforceable than 
domestic court judgments, especially as investors and (parts of) investors’ assets are likely to 
be situated in the investors’ home states.47  
 
A frequent objection to this call for greater equality between host states and investors is 
that the perceived unfairness under investment treaties is in fact essential to rebalance the 
asymmetry that would otherwise exist but for the treaty.48 As explained, the primary purpose 
of investment treaties is to moderate the political risk consequent of the host state’s sovereign 
power. According to this objection, it is the conduct of the state, rather than that of investors, 
that needs to be bridled. However, this is not universally true. Some foreign investors wield 
economic muscle unrivalled by many host states, as was keenly felt, for instance, when the 
multi-billion-dollar tobacco company Phillip Morris brought proceedings against Uruguay.49 
The conduct of foreign investors may need to be restrained as often as the conduct of host 
states.50   
 
Perhaps most importantly, state counterclaims have the potential to address a growing 
perception that investment treaty arbitration suffers from a structural bias against states 
                                                     
45  Andrea Bjorkland “The Role of Counterclaims in Rebalancing Investment Law” (2013) 17 Lewis & 
Clark Law Review 461 at 464. 
 
46   Bjorkland, above n 45, at 476. 
  
47   Hege Elisabeth Veenstra-Kjos “Counterclaims by Host States in Investment Treaty Arbitration” (2007) 
7 Transnational Dispute Management at 11.  
 
48   Bjorkland, above n 45, at 462. 
 
49  Philip Morris Brand Sarl (Switzerland), Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switzerland) and Abal Hermanos 
S.A.(Uruguay) v Oriental Republic of Uruguay ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, (pending). John Oliver 
“Tobacco” Last Week Tonight HBO (United States, 15 February 2015). 
  
50   Gustavo Laborde “The Case for Host State Claims in Investment Arbitration” (2010) 1 Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement 97 at 98. 
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Backlash against the traditional paradigm of investment arbitration as a mechanism for the 
exclusive protection of investors’ rights increasingly poses a challenge to its legitimacy.51 
The critique is that arbitration primarily benefits investors to the detriment of the state and 
establishes a disproportionate balance of arms; arbitral tribunals are “private fora for public 
issues” where social and public interests are ignored.52 As one commentator has remarked, 
‘[a]s the gulf deepens, the complaints get louder and the stability of the system is 
undermined.’53 While criticism of the current international investment regime comes from 
many directions,54 this paper submits that a more permissive approach to state counterclaims 
has the potential to allay this mounting dissatisfaction – to the benefit of host states, foreign 
investors, and investment arbitration as a discipline.  
 
III COUNTERCLAIMS TO DATE: THIRTY YEARS OF FAILURE 
Host state counterclaims in investment treaty arbitration are rarely pleaded and never 
successful, to the extent that one commentator has characterised their use as ‘thirty years of 
failure’.55 Indeed, up until recently, it was doubtful whether states could assert counterclaims 
at all.56 To date, counterclaims have been involved in less that 3 per cent of treaty-based 
arbitrations. It is remarkable, however, that most of those cases have been decided within the 
                                                     
51   Helen Bubrowski “Balancing IIA arbitration through the use of counterclaims” in Armand de Mestral 
and Celine Levesque (eds) Improving International Investment Agreements (Routledge, New York, 
2013) 212 at 214. 
52   See for example: Jeffery Atik “Legitimacy, Transparency and NGO Participation in the NAFTA 
Chapter 11 process” in Todd Weilder (ed) NAFTA Investment Law and Arbitration: Past Issues, 
Current Practice, Future Prospects (Transnational Publishers, New York, 2004) 135 at 140; Mehmet 
Toral and Thomas Schultz “The State, a Perpetual Respondent in Investment Arbitration?” in Michael 
Waibet et al (eds) The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Wolters 
Kluwer, the Hague, 2010) 577 at 577 – 578.  
 
53  Toby Landau QC “Freshfields lecture 2011: Saving investment arbitration from itself” Global 
Arbitration Review. 
  
54   See generally: Michael Waibet et al (eds) The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions 
and Reality (Wolters Kluwer, the Hague, 2010) 577 
 
55   Ana Vohryzek-Griest “State Counterclaims in Investor-State Disputes: A History of 30 Years of 
Failure” (2009) 15 International Law – Revista Colombiana de Derecho Internacional 83 – 124. 
 
56   A. K. Hoffman “Counterclaims by the Respondent State in Investment Arbitrations – The Decision on 
Jurisdiction Over Respondent’s Counterclaim in Saluka Investments B.V. v Czech Republic” (2006) 
Transnational Dispute Management at 5, stating that Jan Paulsson observed in 1995 that “this new 
world of arbitration is one where the claimant need not have a contractual relationship with the 
defendant and where the tables could not be turned: the defendant could not have initiated arbitration, 
nor is it certain of being able even to bring a counterclaim”, followed by “It is now settled – not least 
thanks to [the Saluka decision – that the respondent in an investment arbitration can, theoretically bring 
a counterclaim”. 
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last five years.57 States are apparently becoming more aggressive in asserting counterclaims 
against investors, despite the fact that their efforts have not tended to be successful.58  
 
This Part examines the obstacles that host states must contend with to assert counterclaims 
in investment treaty arbitration and critiques the reasoning of tribunals that have refused to 
hear such counterclaims. To this end, this Part proceeds in three substantive sections. Section 
A looks to the ICSID Convention and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to illustrate that both 
sets of rules explicitly confirm the availability of counterclaims subject to certain 
jurisdictional and admissibility requirements. The next two sections explore those 
requirements in greater detail. Section B examines the effect of core treaty provisions on a 
tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear state counterclaims – namely, the scope of the dispute, 
applicable law and standing. The effect of contractual forum selection clauses is also 
discussed. Finally, Section C critically analyses the reasoning of investment tribunals on the 
question of requisite connection between the subject matter of the counterclaim with that of 
the principal claim.   
 
As indicated, this paper makes a distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility 
(requisite connection). This is not uncontroversial. In dealing with the 
jurisdiction/admissibility distinction, international practice has generated a ‘twilight zone’ of 
definitions,59 and tribunals are divided over how to characterise the question of requisite 
connection. 60  The author prefers to characterise requisite connection as a question of 
admissibility. Jan Paulsson suggests that the hallmark of a successful challenge to 
admissibility is that the claim should not be heard at all (or at least not yet). Contrariwise, the 
hallmark of a successful challenge to jurisdiction is that the claim cannot be brought to the 
                                                     
57    A. Rivas “ICSID Treaty Counterclaims: Case Law and Treaty Evolution (2014) 11 Transnational 
Dispute Management at 2. 
 
58   Bjorkland, above n 45, at 464. 
59  Jan Paulsson “Jurisdiction and Admissibility” (2005) Global Reflections on International Law, 
Commerce and Dispute Resolution 601 at 608. 
  
60   Some consider it a matter of jurisdiction: e.g. Sergei Paushok and others v Government of Mongolia, 
UNCITRAL Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (28 April 2011) and Saluka Investments B.V. v Czech 
Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on Jurisdiction over Czech Republic’s Counterclaim (7 May 2004). 
Others consider it a matter of admissibility: Antoine Goetz and others v Republic of Burundi, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/06/11, Award (21 June 2012); Metal-Tech Ltd v Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/10/3, Award (4 October 2013). See also for discussion: Thomas Kendra “State 
Counterclaims in Investment Arbitration – A New Lease of Life?” (2013) Arbitration International 575 
at 591.   
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particular forum seized.61 It is submitted that a counterclaim that is not sufficiently connected 
with the principal claim is not precluded from being heard in arbitration at all, just not in 
those proceedings. It is conceivable that the same counterclaim could be heard in arbitration 
at a later date, in relation to a different principal claim. It follows that requisite connection is 
a question of admissibility.62  
 
Article 46 of the ICSID Convention supports this characterisation. Article 46 suggests that 
‘direct connection’ is distinct from the parties’ consent, as it is listed as a separate 
condition.63 In this study, jurisdiction is understood as a function of party consent. It seems 
incongruous with the principle of party autonomy in arbitration to hold that a tribunal must 
deny jurisdiction over a counterclaim for lack of connection even if the parties have 
consented to the counterclaims being heard and it falls within the jurisdiction of the Centre.64 
In ICSID arbitral practice, the recent Goetz v Burundi decision clearly delineated jurisdiction 
and admissibility (requisite connection), and has subsequently been heralded as symptomatic 
of a growing trend in arbitral awards towards more methodical and comprehensive reasoning. 
It is therefore likely that future investment tribunals will adopt the same bifurcated 
framework.65  
 
The distinction between jurisdiction and admissibility is not merely semantic. This 
distinction can be crucial as a tribunal’s decision as to its jurisdiction can be subject to review 
by national courts, whereas its findings on admissibility generally are not.66 For example, the 
New York Convention provides that the recognition and enforcement of an award may be 
                                                     
61   Paulsson, above n 59, at 617.  
 
62   Atanasova, above n 1, at 371 – 372. 
 
63  Schreur, above n 41, at 751: “The close connection required by Art. 46 is not a matter of jurisdiction. 
The wording of Art. 46 makes it clear that the “arising directly” requirement must be fulfilled in 
addition to the jurisdictional requirements. A claim may well be within the Centre’s jurisdiction but not 
arise directly from the subject-matter of a particular dispute before the tribunal. An obvious example 
would be a claim arising from a different investment operation between the same investor and the same 
host state. Conversely, a claim may arise directly from the subject-matter of the dispute but may not be 
subject to ICSID’s jurisdiction.” 
 
64  Atanasova, above n 1, at 380. 
 
65  Thomas Kendra “State Counterclaims in Investment Arbitration – A New Lease of Life?” (2013) 
Arbitration International 575 at 593. 
 
66   Douglas, above n 27, at 141.  
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refused if [t]he award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the 
terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of 
the submission to arbitration […]’.67  
 
A ARBITRATION RULES 
Parties to an investment dispute will agree upon a body of rules to govern the arbitration 
procedure (the lex arbitri) in their arbitration agreement. The parties may formulate their own 
rules in this respect, but most often they refer to a standard set of arbitration rules. The most 
commonly used rules in investment arbitration are those provided in the ICSID Convention, 
and in the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 68  Both sets of rules expressly anticipate the 
bringing of counterclaims. Moreover, the rules’ respective travaux préparatoires suggests 
that the drafters expected that counterclaims would form a more regular part of investment 
proceedings, as they do in commercial arbitration.69  
 
1 ICSID CONVENTION 
In 1965, the World Bank promulgated the ICSID Convention in an attempt to remove 
legal and political obstacles to the flow of foreign investment. For this purpose, the 
Convention provides for an International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) to facilitate the peaceful settlement of investment disputes between foreign investors 
and host states through arbitration. The ICSID Convention is purely procedural; the 
substantive rules to be applied to the merits of a dispute are prescribed by the relevant 
investment treaty. 70  In relation to counterclaims, Article 46 of the ICSID Convention 
provides that:71 
 
Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall, if requested by a party, determine any 
incidental or additional claims or counterclaims arising directly out of the subject-matter of the 
dispute provided that they are within the scope of the consent of the parties and are otherwise 
within the jurisdiction of the Centre. 
                                                     
67  New York Convention, above n 35, Art V(1)(c).  
68  Kendra, above n 65, at 576. 
  
69  Kendra, above n 65, at 575. 
 
70  Campbell McLachlan QC, Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger International Investment 
Arbitration: Substantive Principles (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) at 1.05.  
 
71  ICSID Convention, above n 36, Art 46.  
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The Article sets out three conditions to be fulfilled by a counterclaim in order to be 
considered, except otherwise expressly agreed by the parties. First, the counterclaim must be 
within the consent of the parties to the dispute (Part III(B) of this paper). The second 
requirement is that the counterclaim must be connected with the principal claim (Part 
III(C)). The third requirement is for the counterclaim to be within the jurisdiction of the 
Centre; that is to say, it must arise directly out of an investment and be lodged between a 
foreign investor and a state party. 72  The intentionally undefined term “investment” has 
precipitated a wealth of case law and commentary.73  For the purposes of this paper, it 
suffices to note that the counterclaim must arise out of the same investment operation as the 
principal claim, and the meaning of “investment” is likely to be defined in the relevant 
investment treaty. To compare, the third requirement is a condition for jurisdiction and 
refers to the overall investment, whereas the second requirement presupposes jurisdiction 
and refers to a particular dispute.74  
 
Other aspects of the ICSID Convention, and its drafting history, suggest that its drafters 
envisaged that host state counterclaims would become a regular feature of investment treaty 
arbitration. At the outset of this discussion, it should be acknowledged that, at the time the 
ICSID Convention was drafted, the concession contract had been an essential predicate for 
investment arbitration.75 As will be discussed, contract-based arbitrations do not raise the 
same jurisdiction and admissibility issues as treaty-based arbitrations.76 Nevertheless, there is 
nothing inherent in the text of Article 46 to suggest that it is limited to contractual disputes 
and excludes treaty disputes, nor has such a revision been suggested. It is submitted, 
therefore, that its drafting history may still be indicative of the drafters’ intentions in the 
investment treaty context. 
                                                     
72  ICSID, Art 25. 
 
73  Pierre Lalive and Laura Halonen “On the Availability of Counterclaims in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration” in Alexander J. Belohavek and Nadezda Rozehnalova Czech Yearbook of International 
Law: Rights of the Host States within the System of Internaionl Investment Protection (Juris Publishing, 
New York, 2011) 141 at 144. 
 
74 Schreur, above n 41, at 751. 
 
75 McLachlan, above n 70, at 1.06. 
  
76  Discussed in Part II(B).  
 
 
THE BEST DEFENCE IS A GOOD OFFENCE – 
STATE COUNTERCLAIMS IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 
 18 
 
The full title of the ICSID Convention refers to disputes ‘between States and Nationals of 
Other States’, with the use of the word ‘between’ suggesting that claims could flow in both 
directions. Elsewhere, Article 36(1) refers to the institution of arbitral proceedings by either a 
national of a contracting state or a contracting state itself. The World Bank’s Executive Board 
on the Convention expressly recognised the importance of host state claims and counterclaims 
in this respect:77  
 
While the broad objective of the Convention is to encourage a larger flow of private 
international investment, the provisions of the Convention maintain a careful balance 
between the interests of investors and those of host States. Moreover, the Convention permits 
the institution of proceedings by host States as well as investors and the Executive Directors 
have constantly had in mind that the provisions of the Convention should be equally adapted 
to the requirements of both cases. 
 
The treaty tribunal in Amco v Indonesia echoed this same sentiment when it said ‘the 
Convention is aimed to protect, to the same extent and with the same vigour, the investor and 
the host State […]’.78 Finally, it is notable that the 1968 Model Clauses proposed by the 
ICSID Centre provided for claims made only by investors, but the document was later revised 
to contemplate claims by states.79   
 
 
2 UNCITRAL RULES 
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were originally designed for international commercial 
disputes, but have since acquired an important role in investment treaty arbitration. The 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are not promoted by an arbitration institution like ICSID, but 
are instead applied to ad hoc arbitrations. Before looking to the current version of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, it is pertinent to examine its predecessor, as it is the version 
                                                     
77  Report of the Executive Directors of the International Bank for the Reconstruction and Development 
on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, at 13; Schreur, above n 41, at 733 – 734. 
 
78  Amco v Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 September 1983, at 23.  
  
79  Schreur, above n 41, at 733 – 744. 
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most applied by ad hoc investment treaty tribunals to date. Article 19(3) of the 1976 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provided that:80 
 
In its statement of defence, or at a later stage in the arbitral proceedings if the arbitral tribunal 
decides that the delay was justified under the circumstances, the respondent may make a 
counter-claim arising out of the same contract or rely on a claim arising out of the same 
contract for the purpose of a set-off. 
 
The difficulty of transposing this provision into the investment treaty context is the 
reference to ‘the same contract.’ In treaty arbitration, principal claims are typically based on 
an alleged treaty violation and there may not be a contract between the host state and investor 
at all.81 Despite the specific language of Article 19(3), tribunals did exercise jurisdiction over 
counterclaims under the former UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The tribunal in Saluka v 
Czech Republic decided that, as a matter of principle based on similar provisions in the ICSID 
Convention and the Iran/United States Claims Settlement Declaration, where consent to 
arbitration is expressed in wide terms, the tribunal is conferred jurisdiction over host state 
counterclaims.82 The same reasoning was adopted in Paushok v Mongolia.83 In other cases, 
jurisdiction has either been assumed without discussion,84 or conceded by the claimant in 
order to reinforce an assertion of a broad jurisdiction over the principal claims.85 
 
Nevertheless, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were revised in 2010 to modernise the 
text and adapt it to its current use. The provisions relating to counterclaims were widened as 
the specific reference to ‘the same contract’ was removed.86 The Commission in charge of the 
Rules’ modification specifically intended this change to more clearly permit counterclaims in 
                                                     
 
81  Douglas, above n 27, at 258.  
 
82  Saluka Investments B.V. v The Czech Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction over the Czech Republic’s 
Counterclaim (UNCITRAL, 7 May 2004) at 76.  
 
83  Paushok v Mongolia, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (UNCITRAL, 28 April 2011), at 687.  
  
84  Genin v Estonia (Merits) 6 ICSID Rep 236, 271/201, 301-2/376-8 (counterclaim dismissed on the 
merits without consideration of jurisdiction). 
 
85  SGS v Pakistan (Procedural Order) 8 ICSID Rep 388; SGS v Pakistan (Preliminary Objections) 8 
ICSID Rep 406, 426-7/108-9; SGS v Philippines (Prelimiary Objections) 8 ICSID Rep 518, 528/40; 
Sedelmayer v Russia (Merits).   
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investment treaty arbitration; in their words, ‘[t]he limitation to contracts is simply 
inappropriate to arbitration arising under investment treaties’.87 Article 21(3) of the 2010 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules now provides that: 
 
In its statement of defence, or at a later stage in the arbitral proceedings if the arbitral tribunal 
decides that the delay was justified under the circumstances, the respondent may make a 
counter-claim or rely on a claim for the purpose of set-off provided that the arbitral tribunal 
has jurisdiction over it. 
 
Article 21(3) is silent on the degree of connection that must exist between the claim and 
counterclaim. The wording was regarded as ‘broad enough to encompass a wide range of 
circumstances and did not require substantive definitions of the notions of claims for set-off 
and counterclaims.’ 88  It was foreseen future tribunals would apply a requirement of 
connection as a generally accepted principle of legal procedure, as the Saluka tribunal did.89 
 
The most commonly used arbitration rules therefore explicitly confirm the availability of 
host state counterclaims in principle, subject to requirements of jurisdiction and admissibility. 
The following sections consider those requirements in greater detail.  
 
B JURISDICTION 
Consent is the organising principle of jurisdiction in investment treaty arbitration. Host 
states and foreign investors must both consent to arbitrate a dispute before any proceedings 
can be brought before a tribunal, including counterclaims. Consent to arbitrate is generally 
perfected in two steps. First, an investment treaty is negotiated between sovereign states. In 
signing a treaty, a state party extends a standing offer of arbitration to eligible investors of the 
other signatory state (or states, in the case of multilateral investment treaties).90 This standing 
                                                     
87  J. Paulsson and G. Petrochilos Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (September 2006), 
“informal and unpublished report prepared for the UNCITRAL Secretariat and cited in official 
documentation” at 92 -93. 
 
88 United National Commission on International Trade Law Report of the Working Group on Arbitration 
and Conciliation on the Work of its fiftieth session (New York, February 2007), at 31.  
 
89  Paullson, above n 87, at 31.  
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offer delineates the substance of future arbitral proceedings, and is deemed to be irrevocable 
so long as the investment treaty remains in force.91  
 
Secondly, a foreign investor accepts the offer to arbitrate. Some instruments require that 
the investor gives notice of its acceptance in writing,92 but acceptance is typically deemed to 
occur when a foreign investor serves a notice of arbitration upon the host state or the 
arbitration institution designated by the contracting state parties in the treaty.93 It has been 
suggested that an investor may preclude the assertion of host state counterclaims by limiting 
its acceptance of the offer solely to its specific grievance. According to proponents of this 
view, the required mutual consent between the parties would only exist to the extent of the 
overlap between the host state’s offer and the investor’s acceptance (that is, the treaty 
violation). 94  This position must be rejected. By analogy with fundamental contract law 
principles, a host state’s unilateral offer in an investment treaty sets out the terms of its 
consent, nothing more and nothing less. Limited acceptance is akin to a counteroffer, not 
acceptance, and cannot support a finding of mutual consent unless the host state accepts those 
limited terms.95  
 
The investor’s acceptance of the host state’s offer as set out in the investment treaty 
culminates in the parties’ arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement constitutes the 
basis of the parties’ consent and, therefore, a tribunal’s jurisdiction to settle the dispute.96 By 
                                                     
91  Jan Paulsson “Arbitration without Privity” (1995) 10 ICSID Review – FILJ 232 at 234.   
 
92  Energy Charter Treaty (opened for signature Dec 17, 1994), Art 26(4); North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), Art 1121 (opened for signature Dec 17, 1992).  
 
 
93  Douglas, above n 27, at 258.  
  
94   Schreur, above n 41, at 203 and 756. See also H.C. Alvarez “Arbitration Under the North American 
Free Trade Agreement” (2000 16 Arb. Int’l 393 at 410 – 411. 
 
95  Douglas, above n 27, at 491; Kjos, above n 6, at 135 – 136; W. Ben Hamida “L’arbitrage Etat-
investisseur cherche son equilibre perdu: Dans quelle mesure l’Etat peut introduire des demandes 
reconventionelles conre l’investisseur prive?” (2005) 7 International Law FORUM du droit 
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96  Atanasova, above n 1, at 366. 
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virtue of the principle of kompetenz/kompetenz, the tribunal itself decides the extent of its 
jurisdiction to decide the dispute by reference to the arbitration agreement.97   
 
The assertion of host state counterclaims in arbitration is therefore contingent on whether 
the parties’ have consented that the tribunal has jurisdiction to decide counterclaims. The 
most significant obstacles in this respect stem from the asymmetrical structure of investment 
treaties. Substantively, most investment treaties impose obligations on states to maintain 
minimum standards of regulatory treatment vis-à-vis the investor but do not impose any 
reciprocal obligations on investors towards host states.98 Moreover, the arbitration agreement 
does not incorporate the substantive provisions of the BIT nor does it make them applicable 
bilaterally. Thus there can be no legal basis for a counterclaim in the treaty or arbitration 
agreement itself. 99  Nor does international law impose obligations on private parties. 100 
Instead, counterclaims must be based on an investor’s alleged non-compliance with the host 
state’s domestic laws and regulations or breach of an investment contract.101  
 
These obstacles to the assertion of host state counterclaims are very unique to the 
investment treaty context. In contract-based investment arbitration, tribunals have 
traditionally found no difficulty in accepting counterclaims where the investor’s claim is 
based on a pre-existing contract with the host state that includes an arbitration clause.102 
Consent to international arbitration in contract-based disputes is generally found in a single 
instrument: the contract. Contracts are normally bilateral in substance and procedure, in that 
they impose readily recognisable obligations on both parties that may form the legal basis of 
a counterclaim, and dispute resolution clauses usually permit both parties to bring claims 
against the other.103 As the same cannot be said of treaty-based arbitration, the terms of 
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consent given in the BIT must be carefully scrutinised to determine whether the parties’ 
intended for the tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over counterclaims at all.104 
 
This section examines the core provisions that a treaty tribunal must scrutinise to 
ascertain the extent of its jurisdiction over state counterclaims, and highlights how those 
provisions may be more or less ‘counterclaim-friendly’. There are two key provisions in this 
respect.105 The first is the scope of disputes that the parties have agreed to arbitrate. The 
applicable law that the parties have prescribed for resolution of the dispute, while not strictly 
relevant to jurisdiction, may assist to refine this scope.106 The second is whether or not the 
treaty confers standing to both parties. A third consideration that may arise in relation to 
contractual counterclaims is whether the contract is subject to a forum selection clause.107 
 
1 SCOPE OF THE DISPUTE 
The definition of disputes that may be submitted to arbitration provided for in the 
arbitration agreement has a significant influence on the possible assertion of host state 
counterclaims. The scope of the dispute may be defined broadly or narrowly for the purpose 
of jurisdiction ratione materiae.108 To facilitate the assertion of state counterclaims, the scope 
of disputes must be broad enough to include investor obligations that could form the legal 
basis of a counterclaim. Allied to this, the treaty must not preclude the tribunal from applying 
the host state’s general domestic law and/or contract law because host state counterclaims 
will invariably be based in domestic or contract law, not international law.109 
 
The mutual consent of the parties is found in the arbitration agreement but, as this 
agreement is a function of the offer in the investment treaty, a survey of common treaty 
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dispute resolution provisions is helpful in this respect. There are three ‘prototype provisions’ 
that are commonly used in BITs to define the scope of disputes in arbitration.110 This section 
analyses each prototype provision to designate them as more or less ‘counterclaim-friendly’ 
and addresses a number of issues raised in arbitral practice that may affect this designation. 
 
(a) INCLUSIVE OF INVESTOR OBLIGATIONS 
The first prototype provision permits ‘all’ or ‘any’ disputes relating to investments to be 
submitted to an investment treaty tribunal. This is by far the most prevalent type of dispute 
resolution clause in BITs.111 One example is the Netherlands-Czech BIT applied in Saluka v 
Czech Republic, which refers to ‘[a]ll disputes between one Contracting Party and an investor 
of the other Contracting Party concerning an investment of the latter […]’.112  
 
It has been held that this broad form treaty provision is capable of extending the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction to host state counterclaims. 113  One point of controversy, however, has been 
whether broad dispute resolution provisions permit treaty tribunals to exercise jurisdiction 
over contractual disputes in particular. This question is pertinent to the availability of 
counterclaims as many disputes have a contractual origin, and because contracts impose 
obligations on investors that might form the basis of host state counterclaims.114 
 
The objection that has been raised is that purely contractual claims should not, as a matter 
of principle, be covered by broad dispute resolution clauses in BITs. Absent specific 
language to the contrary, the objection contends that a treaty tribunal should not interpret a 
treaty to confer jurisdiction when it has not even been called upon to rule on alleged 
violations of that treaty. Emmanuel Gaillard warns, ‘[t]here is always a danger of divorcing 
the jurisdictional provisions from the substantive terms of the same treaty in that this may 
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suggest that the treaty-based tribunal has jurisdiction but is invited to rule in a vacuum’.115 
Distinguishing purely contract claims from those that would also constitute a violation of the 
BIT, the Tribunal in SGS v Pakistan decided that contractual disputes are not included even 
when the dispute resolution clause is broadly formulated.116 Although it acknowledged that 
violations of the BIT and the contract could both be characterised as “disputes with respect to 
investments”, it held that this term:117 
 
While descriptive of the factual subject matter of the disputes, does not relate to the 
legal basis of the clams, or the cause of action asserted in the claims. In other words, from 
that description alone, without more, we believe that no implication necessarily arises that 
both BIT and purely contract claims are intended to be covered by the Contracting Parties in 
[the dispute resolution clause]. 
 
In contra, the SGS v Philippines tribunal decided that contractual disputes were included 
under an identically worded dispute resolution clause. The SGS v Philippines tribunal found 
that the term ‘“disputes with respect to investments” is not limited by the legal classification 
of the claim that is made’.118 It recognised that ‘investments are characteristically entered into 
by means of contracts or other agreements with the host state and the other investment 
partner’; and therefore, ‘the phrase “disputes with respect to investments” naturally includes 
contractual disputes’. 119  The parties to the BIT could have chosen to limit the dispute 
resolution clause to ‘claims concerning breaches of the substantive standards contained in the 
BIT’ or to ‘claims brought for breach of international standards’ but they did not do so.120 
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 The reasoning of SGS v Philippines should be endorsed, on a textual and policy basis. 
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that ‘a treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose’.121 The ordinary meaning of a 
broad dispute resolution clause strongly suggests that “disputes with respect to investments” 
include disputes between an investor and the host state relating to a breach of an investment 
contract. State practice shows that parties’ who wish to make a distinction will set it out 
specifically in the BIT.122 From a policy perspective, this paper disagrees with Gaillard; to 
the contrary, the exclusion of contractual disputes would require the treaty tribunal to rule in 
a vacuum: ‘If treaties and contracts were ‘clean different things’, one would expect them to 
inhabit different worlds… [b]ut even in legal systems which give no such effect to treaties as 
such, a dualistic construction does not prevail’.123 In effect, an interpretation of broad dispute 
resolution clauses that includes contractual and non-contractual disputes more accurately 
reflects the diverse range of legal relationships implicated in investment disputes.124 
 
The second prototype provision supports this conclusion as to purely contractual disputes 
under the first prototype. The second prototype provision, inspired by the USA Model BIT 
(1994) specifically extends the scope of the treaty tribunal’s ratione materiae to three legal 
sources, as those ‘arising out of or relating to an investment authorisation, an investment 
agreement or an alleged breach of any right conferred, created or recognised by this Treaty 
with respect to the covered investment’. The relevant treaties in Alex Genin and Goetz 
employed language similar to this prototype.125 This provision is “counterclaim-friendly” as 
it encompasses investment authorisations and agreements which include investor obligations. 
Counterclaims presented on the basis of the host state’s domestic law pertaining to other 
matters, however, would fall outside the jurisdiction of the tribunal.126  
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In sum, it is submitted that the first and second prototype provisions are ‘counterclaim-
friendly’, as the tribunal’s jurisdiction extends beyond claims founded upon an investment 
treaty obligation.127 In addition, applicable law clauses which include investment contracts 
and/or the domestic law of the host state are more conducive to the assertion of counterclaims 
than those referring only to the treaty itself and international law, as both contracts and the 
domestic law of the host state usually provide for obligations on the part of investors.128 
 
While not a treaty prototype per se, an express provision granting the right to 
counterclaim is, of course, one way to confer jurisdiction on the treaty tribunal to hear 
counterclaims. At present, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
Investment Agreement is the only investment agreement that expressly grants such a right, in 
the following terms: ‘A Member State against whom a claim is brought by a COMESA 
investor under this Article may assert as a defence, counterclaim, right of set off or other 
similar claim, that the COMESA investor bringing the claim has not fulfilled its obligations 
under this Agreement […]’. The COMESA Agreement itself also provides a legal basis for 
such counterclaims by imposing substantive obligations on investors to comply with 
domestic laws: ‘COMESA investors and their investments shall comply with all applicable 
domestic measures of the Member State in which their investment is made’.129 
 
(b) EXCLUSIVE OF INVESTOR OBLIGATIONS 
The third prototype provision restricts the subject matter of arbitration exclusively to 
alleged violations of substantive provisions of the treaty. A minority of treaties are of this 
type. In such cases, counterclaims would fall outside the parties’ consent to arbitration and 
consequently the tribunal could not exercise jurisdiction to hear them.  
 
Spyridon Roussalis v Romania is notable as the only case to reject a counterclaim on the 
basis of absence of consent. In the case, Roussalis claimed that its investments were subject 
to a series of ‘malicious and unjustifiable acts taken by various agencies of the Romanian 
government’, amounting to an indirect expropriation or, at least, substantial impairment, of 
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its investments in violation of the applicable Greece-Romania BIT. 130  In turn, Romania 
asserted counterclaims against the claimant arising out its alleged failure to make post-
purchase payments under a share purchase agreement.131  
 
The majority declined jurisdiction over Romania’s counterclaims on the basis that the 
investor had not consented to the counterclaims being heard. The BIT provided that the 
tribunal had jurisdiction over ‘[d]isputes between an investor of a Contracting Party and the 
other Contracting Party concerning an obligation of the latter under this Agreement…’.132 
The majority noted that this dispute resolution clause referred only to the bringing of 
proceedings by the investor in the event that the state breaches its obligations. This 
‘undoubtedly limit[s] jurisdiction to claims brought by investors about obligations of the host 
state.’133 Furthermore, the applicable law clause of the BIT reinforced this conclusion, as it 
did not refer to domestic law but only to international law and the BIT itself.134 
 
The third arbitrator in Roussalis, Professor Michael Reisman, disagreed with the analysis 
of the majority.135 Reisman cited two main reasons for his dissent. First, in his view, the 
investor must be deemed to have consented to the bringing of counterclaims when instituting 
ICSID proceedings: 
 
When the State Parties to a BIT contingently consent, inter alia, to ICSID jurisdiction, the 
consent component of Article 46 of the Washington Convention is ipso facto imported into any 
ICSID arbitration which an investor then elects to pursue. It is important to bear in mind that 
such counterclaim jurisdiction is not only a concession to the State Party: Article 46 works to 
the benefit of both respondent state and investor. 
 
 
                                                     
130  Spyridon Roussalis v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, 7 December 2011, at 760 and 763. 
131  Crawford, above n 99, at 365. 
  
132  Greece-Romania BIT, Art 9. 
 
133  Roussalis, above n 130, at 869.  
 
134  Roussalis, above n 130, at 871.  
 
135  Spyridon Roussalis v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/01, Dissenting Opinion of W. Michael 
Reisman at 146. 
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Reisman’s second reason for allowing the counterclaims recalls the rationale and role of 
counterclaims identified in Part II of this paper: 
 
In rejecting ICSID jurisdiction over counterclaims, a neutral tribunal – which was, in fact, 
selected by the claimant – perforce directs the respondent state to pursue its claims in its own 
court where the very investor who had sought a forum outside the state apparatus is now 
constrained to become the defendant. (And if an adverse judgment ensues, that erstwhile 
defendant might well transform to claimant again, bringing another BIT claim.) Aside from 
duplication and inefficiency, the sorts of transaction costs which counter-claim and set-off 
procedures work to avoid, it is an ironic, if not absurd outcome, at odds, in my view, with the 
objectives of international investment law. 
 
This view has found support in arbitral practice. In the recent Goetz decision, the tribunal 
endorsed Reisman’s reasoning, even though such a finding was unnecessary for the tribunal to 
exercise jurisdiction over the counterclaims before it. The Goetz tribunal commented that:136 
 
… by the very act of entering the Treaty, Burundi has accepted that any disputes which go 
to arbitration under the ICSID framework will be governed by the terms of and according to 
the rules laid down under the Washington Convention. In particular, it is accepted that 
incidental or additional claims or counterclaims brought during proceedings would be 
considered by the Tribunal under the conditions laid down by Article 46 of the Convention of 
Article 40 of the Arbitration Rules. By accepting the offer made in the Treaty, the Goetz 
parties for their part accepted that this would be the case. This two-fold consent gives the 
tribunal jurisdiction to hear counterclaims. 
 
With respect, the reasoning of Professor Reisman should not be followed. Reisman’s 
interpretation means that the bringing of a claim to ICISD could in and of itself be construed 
as consent to any counterclaim, as long as the counterclaim arises directly out of the principal 
claim.137 In the author’s view, ipso facto incorporation of Article 46 brings with it the three 
requirements set out above, including the requirement that the parties have given consent to 
                                                     
136  Antoine Goetz and others v Republic of Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/2, Award, 21 June 2012, at 
278. The tribunal did not need to make such a finding because the wording of the Belgium-
Luxembourg-Burundi treaty invoked defines ‘disputes relating to investments’ broadly, covering 
individual investment agreements, any investment authorisations, or any rights under the BIT itself.  
 
137   Atanasova, above n 1, at 367. 
 
THE BEST DEFENCE IS A GOOD OFFENCE – 
STATE COUNTERCLAIMS IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 
 30 
counterclaims. In other words, the application of Article 46 presupposes consent; it does not 
determine consent. This point is supported by the scheme of the ICSID Convention and its 
travaux préparatoires. Article 46 is located in the Convention’s section on “Powers and 
Functions of the Tribunal” and not in the section on the “Jurisdiction of the Centre”.138 
Moreover, Aron Broches, the principal architect of the ICSID Convention, made clear that 
Article 46 was ‘in no may intended to extend the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal’139; 
‘rather, it is intended to obviate separate proceedings for connected claims, but in all cases 
there must be a specific undertaking to admit the question to arbitration.’140 
 
On the other hand, Douglas has argued that Reisman’s dissent should be followed. He 
argues that ‘a limitation upon the scope of the host state’s consent to arbitration in respect of 
investor’s claims does not necessarily apply to the host state’s counterclaims… [I]f a 
counterclaim is sufficiently factually linked with the main claim, it ipso facto falls within the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal’.141 The difficulty with this argument is that there is no 
apparent reason to treat the jurisdictional requirement of consent to counterclaims differently 
to that of principal claims. Indeed, a counterclaim constitutes a separate and independent 
claim by virtue of which the host state may be awarded a remedy against the investor, and it is 
therefore reasonable that the latter must be deemed to have consented to the bringing of that 
counterclaim. 142  Only once this consent is established should the factual connection of 
counterclaims to the principal claims be scrutinised. 
 
Admittedly, the notion of implied consent from the very act of bringing a claim is an 
attractive one, especially in view of the value that counterclaims could bring to investment 
arbitration identified in Part II of this paper. In this respect, an analogy can be drawn with the 
                                                     
138  Schreur, above n 41, at 733. 
  
139 Summary Record of Proceedings, Geneva Consultative Meeting of Legal Experts (February 17 -22, 
1964) in History of the ICSID Convention, Vol. 2 (ICSID 1970) 367, 422.  
 
140   Chairman’s Report on the Regional Consultative Meetings of Legal Experts, in History of the ICSID 
Convention, Vol. 2 (ICSID 1970) 557, 573. 
 
141  Zachary Douglas “Enforcement of Environmental Norms” in Pierre-Marie Duuy and Jorge E. Vinuales 
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field of sovereign and diplomatic immunity.143  In Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino 
(1964), the United States Supreme Court held that even though a state would normally be 
immune from suit by private parties in foreign courts, ‘fairness has been thought to require 
that when the sovereign seeks recovery, it be subject to legitimate counterclaims against it’.144 
In other words, the fact that a state presents a claim estops it from benefiting from its 
immunity with respect to counterclaims. There are, however, fundamental differences 
between the decision of a domestic court to ‘cut into the doctrine of immunity’ and an arbitral 
tribunal’s decision to exercise jurisdiction over a counterclaim that is not covered by the 
arbitration agreement. Sovereign and diplomatic immunity is a reason for the court not to 
exercise jurisdiction that it already has over a defendant. In contradistinction, an arbitral 
tribunal’s jurisdiction is dependent on the investor’s consent.145 Therefore, the tribunal does 
not have the same freedom to permit counterclaims in pursuit of fairness, procedural 
economy, justice, or otherwise.  
 
In sum, counterclaims cannot be asserted under a dispute resolution clause that restricts the 
scope of the parties’ consent to breach of host state obligations under the relevant investment 
treaty. This is true regardless of whether or not the treaty incorporates the ICSID Convention 
and Arbitration Rules. Hence, a BIT that adopts this third prototype provision is closer to an 
‘international quasi-review of national regulatory action’, where there is no place for 
counterclaims.146 For completeness, it must be noted that the two most prominent multilateral 
investment treaties, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT), adopt clauses similar to this third prototype provision.147  
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2 STANDING 
The host state’s locus standi in an investment treaty may offer clues as to the scope of the 
parties’ consent over counterclaims – but it is not dispositive. It is likely that a treaty that 
permits host state claims would also permit host state counterclaims.148 This follows from the 
proposition that a counterclaim is a separate claim ‘to be treated by the arbitral tribunal 
essentially in the same manner as if it were an original claimant’s demand’.149 The United 
States-Estonia BIT, at issue in Alex Genin, is an example. That BIT provides ‘[o]nce the 
national or company concerned has so consented [to binding arbitration], either Party to the 
dispute may initiate arbitration in accordance with the choice so specified in the consent.’150 
Similar provisions are found in the UK-Jamaica BIT,151 the Iranian and the Peruvian Model 
BITs,152 and the ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments.153  
 
The opposite is not necessarily true, however. In treaties where host states do not have 
locus standi, the situation is not substantially different than when they do, as the separate 
consent of the investor is always required. In this way, a treaty that does not provide locus 
standi to host states may simply better reflect the practical function of investment treaty 
arbitration and express the host state’s unqualified willingness to arbitrate.154 Accordingly, 
sole reference to investors locus standi does not constitute an obstacle to host state 
counterclaims.155 
 
 
 
                                                     
148  Kjos, above n 6, at 139. 
   
149  UNCITRAL Secretariat Possible Future Work in the Area of International Commercial Arbitration, 6 
April 1999, A/CN.9/460 at 72. 
   
150  US-Estonia BIT, Art VI(1)(b).  
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3 FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE 
Forum selection clauses affect the admissibility of a contact. A forum selection clause is a 
provision in a contract whereby the parties agree that any litigation resulting from that 
contract will be settled in a specific forum. Where the legal basis of a counterclaim is a 
contract subject to a forum selection clause that designates a forum other than arbitration, 
investment tribunals will generally decline or stay its jurisdiction.156 This was the basis for 
the majority holdings in SGS v Pakistan and SGS v Phillippines that a contractual claim under 
a BIT cannot be pursued in breach of an applicable exclusive jurisdiction clause, in line with 
the pacta sunt servanda principle.157 
 
The same tribunal may, however, retain jurisdiction over the investor’s treaty claim.158 In 
cases where the line between the contact and the treaty aspects of the investor’s claim are 
sufficiently blurred, the parties may be advised, in the interests of procedural economy, to 
rescind the forum selection clause so that the tribunal is be competent to hear both contract 
and treaty claim.159 This is particularly compelling where the investor has requested a stay of 
proceedings. As was noted in SGS v Pakistan:160 
 
It would be inequitable if, by reason of the invocation of ICSID jurisdiction, the 
Claimant could on the one hand elevate its side of the dispute to international adjudication 
and, on the other, preclude the Respondent from pursuing its own claim for damages by 
obtaining a stay of those proceedings for the pendency of the international proceedings, if 
such international proceedings could not encompass the Respondent’s claim.  
 
Rescission of the forum selection clause, however, is a decision for the investor and the host 
state and not the tribunal. Hence, contractual form selection clauses may pose a significant 
obstacle for a state to assert counterclaims based on contract in arbitration.  
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4 INTERIM CONCLUSIONS ON JURISDICTION 
A tribunal’s jurisdiction over counterclaims depends upon the extent to which a particular 
counterclaim falls within the scope of disputes as defined in the parties’ arbitration 
agreement. The Roussalis minority view that incorporation of arbitration rules by reference in 
the arbitration agreement may be used to ascertain consent must be rejected as contrary to the 
scheme and travaux préparatoires of Article 46.  
 
It would be easier for host states to assert counterclaims where the tribunal’s jurisdiction 
ratione materiae is broad, whether it is generic referring to ‘all disputes’ or delinates a 
number of legal sources such as authorisations and agreements. Counterclaims cannot be 
asserted where the tribunal has narrow jurisdiction ratione materiae pertaining solely to host 
state obligations. Moreover, it is easier for host states to assert counterclaims where it has 
locus standi, but lack of locus standi is not dispositive. An applicable law clause that directs a 
the tribunal to exclusively apply international law or the BIT itself prevents the assertion of 
state counterclaims as neither international law nor the BIT impose ibligations on 
investors.161 
 
 An important addendum to these conclusions is that the investor may at any stage 
consent to the assertion of host state counterclaims (provided that the counterclaim complies 
with admissibility and time frame requirements). An investor may wish to do so given the 
time and expense that may be saved in consolidating the parties claims into one set of 
proceedings.162 However, this incentive has its limits. An investor may be well advised to 
refuse its consent to jurisdiction over counterclaims as a litigation strategy. In particular, it 
may force the state to initiate claims before a separate forum in the hope that the additional 
time and expense will deter the state from bringing the claim at all. Refusing consent may 
also be a strategic way to turn the eye of the tribunal away from the investor’s wrongdoing to 
focus more on the behaviour of the host state.163 
 
Going forward, host states should be advised to make express provisions for 
counterclaims in their BITs. In this respect, the author notes that the United Nations 
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Conference on Trade and Development, in its recent World International Investment Report, 
made the same recommendation.164 Whether foreign investors would be amenable to the 
inclusion of such express provision remains to be seen. 
 
C REQUISITE CONNECTION  
1 FACTUAL AND LEGAL CONNECTION 
The next obstacle that host states must contend with to bring counterclaims is that the 
subject matter of a counterclaim must be connected with that of the principal claim. As stated 
in Saluka v Czech Republic, ‘a legitimate counterclaim must have a close connexion with the 
primary claim to which it is a response’.165 This requirement is applied in virtually all legal 
systems in which counterclaims operate and thus it is an ideal subject for the comparative 
exercise undertaken in this section.166  
 
In most treaty arbitrations involving counterclaims, the requisite connection issue has not 
been discussed. Counterclaims tend to be either dismissed at the jurisdiction stage or, on the 
other hand, their close connection with the subject matter is deemed “too obvious” to merit 
attention. In a few cases, requisite connection was neither raised by the parties nor addressed 
by the tribunal. Only rarely have tribunals made a specific finding that a counterclaim relates 
to the object of the dispute or that it is admissible in principle. As a result, it is difficult to 
discern a consistent methodology from the cases.167  
 
This section surveys the jurisprudence of the ICJ, the Iran/US Claims Tribunal and early 
contract-based arbitration for guidance on the question of requisite connection. It then 
analyses the recent treaty tribunal practice on the same issue. This section argues that recent 
treaty tribunal practice has taken an unjustifiably narrow approach to requisite connection 
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that renders the assertion of host state counterclaims virtually impossible. It is submitted that 
the recent cases of Saluka v Czech Republic and Paushok v Mongolia unduly relied on the 
jurisprudence of earlier tribunals that dealt with principal claims based on contract and, in 
doing so, neglected to sensibly adapt the requisite connection requirement to treaty-based 
arbitrations. The most recent case of Goetz v Burundi appears to have taken a more flexible 
approach to requisite connection but its brief reasoning is of little assistance to future 
tribunals.  
 
(a) CONNECTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE  
Article 80 of the ICJ Rules of Court is almost identical to Article 46 of the ICSID 
Convention and, as such, is a particularly useful point of comparison. Article 80 permits the 
Court to ‘entertain a counterclaim only if it comes within the jurisdiction of the Court and is 
directly connected with the subject-matter of the claim of the other party’. 168  
 
In Oil Platforms, the United States submitted counterclaims asserting that Iran’s 
conduct prior to the US’ alleged wrongful acts was a violation of international law and that 
the US’ measures were in fact countermeasures. Iran claimed that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction 
to hear the counterclaims as the US’ attacks could not be considered as related to commerce 
and navigation, which was the subject matter of the treaty invoked as jurisdictional title by 
Iran. Moreover, Iran contended that there was no direct connection because the claims were 
too general.169 
 
The majority held that it had jurisdiction to hear the counterclaims, as freedom of 
commerce and navigation was broad enough to encompass anything that might inhibit it. 
With respect to direct connection, the Court stated that due to the lack of definition of 
“direct connection” in the Rules, it was for the Court, in its sole discretion, to determine 
on a case-by-case basis, both in facts and in law, whether such connection exists.170 The 
Court ultimately found that the counterclaims were admissible as the facts on which the 
parties relied formed part of the ‘same factual complex’ as the principal claims, 
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specifically, the counterclaims are alleged to have occurred at the same time and within 
the same area, and pursue the same legal aim (that is, establishment of a violation of the 
Treaty of Amity 1955 – the Court found them to be admissible).171 Virtually the same test 
was articulated in the earlier case of Genocide Convention.172  
 
Direct connection in the ICJ is thus evaluated on a case-by-case basis in facts (space 
and time) and law (the legal instrument invoked and the legal aim).173 Higgins was careful to 
note that ‘direct connection’ is not a strict test requiring identity in both fact and law:174  
 
In both civil and common law domestic systems, as in the Rules of the Court, a defendant 
seeking to bring a counter-claim must show the Court has jurisdiction to pronounce upon 
them. But it is not essential that the basis of jurisdiction in the claim and in the 
counterclaim be identical. It is sufficient that there is jurisdiction. (Indeed, were it 
otherwise, counter-claims in, for example, tort could never be brought, as they routinely 
are, to actions initiated in contract.) 
 
This flexible approach was reiterated in the Armed Activities case: “[A]s the 
jurisprudence of the Court reflects, counter-claims do not have to rely on identical 
instruments to meet the “connection” test of Article 80 [of the ICJ Rules]”. 175  This 
flexibility has its limits, however. Judge Oda in Oil Platforms warned, too broad a 
definition of counterclaims may lead to a situation in which ‘we put what may have 
originally been somewhat distinct matters into one melting-pot without making careful 
examination of the essential character of [the] claim[s]’.176  
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(b) CONNECTION IN THE IRAN/US CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 
The Iran/US Claims Tribunal was established under the Algiers Declarations to 
‘resolve the crisis’ in Iran/US relations stemming from the ‘November 1979 hostage 
crisis… and the subsequent freezing of assets by the United States’.177 Article II(1) of the 
Algiers Accords provides that a counterclaim ‘must arise out of the same contract, 
transaction or occurrence that constitutes the subject matter of [the] national’s claim.’178 
The Tribunal’s extensive jurisprudence is helpful in relation to counterclaims arising 
from a different contract than the one invoked by the claimant in the proceedings, and 
arising out of domestic law.179  
 
In most cases, determination of whether a counterclaim arises out of the same 
contract as the principal claim is unproblematic.  Exceptionally, the tribunal has found 
that a series of separate contracts can be treated as one “transaction” for the purpose of 
counterclaims. 180  Westinghouse Electric Crop v Iran is a seminal decision on the 
admissibility of counterclaims regarding a separate contract.181 The principal claims were 
based on four contacts concerning the development of an Integrated Electronics Depot 
(the “Depot”) which the claimant had designed and assisted the respondent in 
establishing for the repair and maintenance of weapon and electronics systems. The 
counterclaims were based on different contracts than the principal claim, which 
nevertheless involved Depot. In the Tribunal, it was evident that each of the contracts on 
which the counterclaims were based was legally separate and distinct from the contracts 
referred to in the principal claim. However, examination of the contracts revealed that 
they had a strong factual interrelationship and the Depot project as a whole went forward 
as a joint venture. The counterclaims were found to be admissible.182  
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At the time of that decision, American Bell was the only case that had found separate 
contracts to constitute a transaction.183 In that case, three contracts were concluded to 
cover the continued performance of the same work by the claimant for successive periods 
of time in a single project. The claims were based on the second and third contracts (each 
covering one year periods) while the counterclaims were based on the first contract 
(which covered a three and a half month interim until the second contract was 
concluded). The Tribunal found that, in light of these particular circumstances, the 
linkage between all three contracts is “sufficiently strong” to make them a single 
transaction for the purpose of admissibility.184  
 
It may be however, that a purported counterclaim based on a contract or transaction 
cannot be said to “arise out” of it. The Iran/US Claims Tribunal jurisprudence is 
relatively settled on this question: a counterclaim does not arise out of a contract where 
any person or entity may find itself in a position to fulfil the obligations arising from 
general domestic law, notwithstanding the existence of any specific contractual or other 
relationship with the state. This includes domestic laws, such as tax law, social security 
law, custom duties and penal law. This rule does not apply where “the contract includes 
provisions which create specific obligations, which do not exist in the law, of one party 
towards the other, in relation to the burden of taxes to be paid, or provisions which set 
forth conditions for payment of amounts earned under the contract in relation to the 
payment of taxes”.185  
 
(c) CONNECTION IN THE CONTRACT-BASED ARBITRATION 
Most early cases in investment arbitration arose from the breach of an investment 
contract. In contract-based arbitration, tribunals have generally accepted that the pleaded 
counterclaims are sufficiently connected with the principal claims without discussion.186 
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Klöckner v Cameroon was the first case to closely analyse the conditions for bringing 
counterclaims in contract-based arbitration.187 The case is a classic example of the kind of 
failed industrial projects that often occur in developing countries.188 Klöckner, a German 
investor, undertook to construct a fertiliser factory in Cameroon; to be responsible for its 
technical and commercial management for at least five years; and to be a 51 per cent 
shareholder in a Cameroonian joint venture. In turn, Cameroon undertook to develop a 
furnished site for the factory and guarantee payment of a loan.  
 
Unfortunately, after 18 months of unprofitable and sub-capacity operation under 
Klöckner’s management, the factory was shut down in 1978.  Klöckner brought ICSID 
arbitration on the basis of its own contract with Cameroon to claim the outstanding 
balance of the price of supplying the factory. In response, Cameroon made a counterclaim 
against Klöckner, alleging that the joint venture failed due to Klöckner’s flawed 
management. Cameroon’s counterclaim was based on a different contract than the 
principal claim. 
 
After finding jurisdiction,189 the Tribunal held that the counterclaim was connected to 
the principal claim. The different contracts were viewed as part of the same deal, a 
contractual ensemble ‘bound together by a close connecting factor’. The Tribunal noted, 
‘[t]he reciprocal obligations had a common origin, identical sources, and an operational 
unity […] They were assumed for the accomplishment of a single goal, and are thus 
interdependent.’ 190  Ultimately, however, the Tribunal rejected Klöckner’s claim and 
Cameroon’s counterclaim on the merits because responsibility for the failure of the 
project was shared.191  
                                                                                                                                                                     
the Tribunal considers, therefore, that is bound to uphold its competence’. This statement is nothing 
more than pure tautology. 
 
187  Klöckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH and others v United Republic of Cameroon and Societe 
Camerounaise des Enrais ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2, Award, 21 October 1983.  
 
188  Jan Paulsson “The ICSID Klockner v Cameroon Award: The Duties of Partners in North-South 
Economic Development Agreements” (1984) 1 Journal of International Arbitration 145 at 145.  
 
189  Jurisdiction was actually one of the thorniest issues of the case, but not pertinent to this analysis. 
 
190   Klöckner, as quoted by Paulsson, above n 188, at 152.  
 
191 Kendra, above n 65, above n 581.   
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Klöckner was decided before Westinghouse and American Bell and appears to have 
adopted similar reasoning, in looking to the ultimate purpose of the contracts and their 
interrelationship to ascertain whether different contracts were connected. This reflects a 
pragmatic approach to the specific circumstances of that case; a pragmatism which is not 
indicative of the future ahead.  
 
2 RECENT TREATY TRIBUNAL PRACTICE  
(a) SALUKA INVESTMENTS V THE CZECH REPUBLIC (2004) 
While the subsequent years after the Klöckner decision did see counterclaims raised 
by host states from time to time, the UNCITAL Tribunal in Saluka v Czech Republic is 
the first to examine the question of requisite connection in detail. 192  In a partial 
privatisation, Saluka acquired a substantial minority shareholding in a state-owned bank. 
After a series of controversial events, the bank became insolvent and was put into 
involuntary administration and sold for a pittance to another bank. Saluka brought claims 
against the Czech Republic under the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT alleging 
deprivation of investment and violation of fair and equitable treatment. The Czech 
Republic brought counterclaims for, inter alia, various breaches of Czech banking, 
competition and tax laws.  
 
The Tribunal held that it could exercise jurisdiction over the counterclaims as they 
fell within the broad scope of consent in the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT as a 
dispute ‘concerning an investment’. 193  However, the counterclaims were ultimately 
rejected for lack of requisite connection with the principal claims. In so deciding, the 
Tribunal observed that no universal attempt to define requisite connection is likely to be 
successful.194 To inform its reasoning, the Tribunal nevertheless drew heavily from the 
jurisprudence of ICSID and the Iran/US Claims Tribunal, 195  including Klöckner, 
Westinghouse and American Bell.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
192  Saluka Investments B.V. v The Czech Republic Decision on Jurisdiction over the Czech Republic’s 
Counterclaim (UNCITRAL), 7 May 2004. 
 
193  Saluka, above n 192, at 60. 
 
194  Saluka, above n 192, at 62.  
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The Tribunal held that the Czech Republic’s counterclaims were not connected with 
the principal claims because they involved ‘non-compliance with the general law of the 
Czech Republic’ or ‘rights and obligations which are applicable, as a matter of general 
law of the Czech Republic, to persons subject to the Czech Republic’s jurisdiction’. It 
followed, according to the Tribunal, that the disputes underlying the counterclaims ‘in 
principle fall to be decided through the appropriate procedures of Czech law and not 
through the particular investment protection procedures of the Treaty’. To reach this 
decision, the Tribunal directly quoted Klöckner with approval, and stated that the Czech 
Republic’s counterclaims ‘cannot be regarded as constituting an “indivisible whole” with 
the primary claim… or as invoking obligations which share with the primary claim “a 
common origin, identical sources, and an operational unity”’.196 
 
This approach to requisite connection cannot be endorsed in the context of investment 
treaty arbitration. This paper objects to the tribunal’s reasoning in two main respects. 
First, a requirement of legal symmetry of the principal claim and counterclaim does not 
reflect the practical reality of investment treaty disputes; and, secondly, the wholesale 
rejection of state counterclaims based on general domestic law for lack of requisite 
connection is unsupported in law and in principle.197  
 
Saluka’s insistence that the claim and counterclaim have “identical sources, and an 
operational unity” is a function of its reliance on Klöckner, Westinghouse and American 
Bell. In treaty arbitration, this proposition would have the effect of excluding a treaty 
tribunal’s jurisdiction over counterclaims whenever the principal claim is based on an 
alleged treaty violation. This is because, as discussed, investment treaties do not include 
any investor obligations on which a counterclaim could be based.  
 
 The Saluka Tribunal was not attentive to the unique aspects of treaty arbitration 
that would warrant departure form previous contract-based jurisprudence. In relation to 
Klöckner, the test in that case was adopted to identify a single on-going ‘transaction’ or 
‘business relationship’ that could serve to connect different contracts.198 This test for 
                                                     
196  Douglas, above n 27, at 260. 
 
197   Atanasova, above n 1, at 383. 
198  Douglas, above n 27, at 261. 
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requisite connection is inappropriate in the investment treaty context, where a host state 
may not have any direct relationship with the investor, contractual or otherwise. In fact, 
Klöckner’s suitability in contract-based arbitration beyond its specific facts can also be 
questioned as, recalling Judge Higgins comments, counterclaims based on tort are 
regularly admitted in disputes arising out of a contract.199 
 
In relation to the Iran/US Claims Tribunal, the Algiers Accords confers jurisdiction 
over counterclaims ‘which arise out of the same contract, transaction or occurrence that 
constitutes the subject matter’ of the primary claim. Hence, the Iran/US Claims Tribunal 
is specifically directed to analyse the legal symmetry of the claim and counterclaim. In 
contra, the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT has a broad dispute resolution clause that 
extends the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over ‘[a]ll disputes between one Contracting Party 
concerning an investment of the latter’. This is significantly broader than the jurisdiction 
granted to the Iran/US Claims Tribunal, and thus requisite connection should not be 
dismissed due to mere legal asymmetry.200 
 
The second objection is that Saluka’s wholesale rejection of state counterclaims based 
on domestic law for lack of connection is unsupported in law and in principle. The 
Tribunal relied on several precedents where the principal claim is based on a contract 
with the host state, and the counterclaim was founded on an obligation in general 
domestic law (such as a tax obligation). From ICSID, the Tribunal relied on Amco v 
Indonesia No 2.201 In that case, Indonesia raised a counterclaim for ‘tax fraud’ on the part 
of the claimants and sought restitution of sums representing the tax allegedly evaded by 
the claimants throughout the relevant period of the investment. The counterclaim was 
ultimately rejected on the basis of jurisdiction. Saluka appears to have heavily relied on 
the following passage from Amco:202  
 
                                                     
199  Atanasova, above n 1, at 384. 
 
200  Douglas, above n 27, at 263.  
 
201  Douglas, above n 27. 
 
202  Amco v Indonesia No. 2 (Preliminary Objections) 1 ICSID Rep 543 at 565. 
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[I]t is correct to distinguish between the rights and obligations that are applicable to legal 
or natural persons who are within the reach of a host state’s jurisdiction, as a matter of 
general law; and rights and obligations that are applicable to an investor as a consequence 
of an investment agreement entered into with that host state. Legal disputes relating to the 
latter will fall under Article 25(1) of the Convention. Legal disputes concerning the former 
in principle fall to be decided by the appropriate procedures in the relevant jurisdiction 
unless the general law generates an investment dispute under the Convention. 
 
The obligation not to engage in tax fraud is clearly a general obligation of law in Indonesia. 
It was not specially contracted for in the investment agreement and does not arise directly 
out of the investment.  
 
This passage from Amco echoes the Iran/US Claims Tribunal on this matter. The 
Saluka Tribunal appears to have understood this passage as a wholesale rejection of state 
counterclaims based on domestic law in treaty arbitration. However, this fails to 
recognise the context in which the statement is made. Amco declined jurisdiction over the 
tax claim, not for lack of requisite connection, but because it was not based on a ‘legal 
dispute arising directly out of the investment’ as required by Article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention (the third requirement in Article 46, discussed at Part III(A) of this paper).203 
It follows that the tax claim may have been heard if it was a legal dispute arising directly 
out of the investment. As the Saluka Tribunal did find that the Czech Republic’s 
counterclaims were within its jurisdiction as ‘concerning an investment’, reliance on 
Amco to reject the counterclaims was misplaced. 
 
The test under Article 25 of ICSID for a ‘legal dispute arising out of an investment’ is 
substantially similar to the dispute resolution clause in the Netherlands-Czech Republic 
BIT. Therefore, in light of Amco, it may have been open to the Saluka Tribunal to reject 
the Czech Republic’s counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that the 
counterclaims did not concern an investment.204 In electing to decide the case on the basis 
of requisite connection instead, the tribunal adopted a test that denies that counterclaims 
can ever be based on the domestic laws of the host state.  
 
                                                     
203  Douglas, above n 27, at 262.  
 
204  Kjos, above n 6, 152. 
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In sum, Saluka’s insistence on legal symmetry to establish requisite connection and its 
denial that general domestic law can ever form the basis of a state counterclaims renders 
the assertion of state counterclaims virtually impossible. The reasoning in Saluka is based 
on non-treaty jurisprudence which obscured the unique context of treaty arbitration. The 
focus of investment treaties is the ‘investment’, a potentially broad term. Insistence on 
legal symmetry of the principal claim and counterclaim overlooks the “mosaic of laws” 
that may be involved in an investment dispute (international, domestic and 
contractual).205  
 
(b) PAUSHOK V MONGOLIA (2011) 
Despite the deficient reasoning of Saluka, the case was cited with approval by the 
UNCITRAL Tribunal in Paushok v Mongolia.206 The investor, a Russian national who owned 
gold mines through a company, claimed that Mongolia had breached the applicable Russia-
Mongolia BIT by implementing a windfall profit tax commodities and a fee on foreign 
workers. Mongolia advanced seven counterclaims on various grounds: tax evasion, claims to 
pay back workers fees, illicit inter-group transfers leading to further tax and levies evasion, 
violation of a licence agreement obliging the claimant to extract gold in a manner leading to 
further loss in taxes and revenues, violations of environmental and allegations of drug 
smuggling.207  
 
The Russia-Mongolia BIT contained a broadly worded dispute resolution clause similar to 
that in Saluka in terms of subject matter and locus standi, and the reasoning of Saluka was 
extensively referred to by the Paushok tribunal. The Tribunal pronounced the test that it 
applied in considering the counterclaims in the following terms:208   
 
In considering whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider the counterclaims, it must 
therefore decide whether there is a close connection between them and the primary claim 
from which they arose or whether the counterclaims are matters than are otherwise 
covered by the general law of Respondent.  
                                                     
205   Douglas, above n 27, at 40. 
 
206  Paushok v Mongolia, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (UNCITRAL) 28 April 2011.   
 
207  Kendra, above n 65, at 583. 
  
208 Paushok, above n 206, at 678. 
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Paushok’s either/or proposition denies that matters covered by general domestic law can ever 
be closely connected with the principal claim. As to the counterclaims relating to Mongolia 
tax law, it opined:209 
 
All these issues squarely fall within the scope of the exclusive jurisdiction of Mongolian 
courts, and are governed by Mongolian public law, and cannot be considered as 
constituting an indivisible part of the Claimant’s claims based on the BIT and 
international law or as creating a reasonable nexus between the Claimant’s claims and the 
Counterclaims justifying their joint consideration by an arbitral tribunal exclusively 
vested with jurisdiction under the BIT. 
 
It follows from these comments that counterclaims arising from any source of law other than 
international law or the BIT itself are inadmissible. The decision has been criticised as ‘a 
typical example of arbitral decisions that often suffer from a lack of structured reasoning and 
of a greater conception of international investment law’,210 and it may be that the Tribunal 
conflated the issues of jurisdiction and admissibility. Insofar as the passages above are 
intended to refer to the requisite connection criterion, Paushok hence suffers from the same 
deficiencies in logic as Saluka.  
 
(c) ANTOINE GOETZ V REPUBLIC OF BURUNDI (2012) 
The recent decision in Goetz v Burundi appears to have adopted a better approach.211 The 
facts are briefly as follows. AFFIMET, founded and owned by Antoine Goetz and others, was 
engaged in the production and trade of precious metals in Burundi. AFFIRMET claimed that 
Burundi had breached conditions of a settlement agreement that had damaged its profitability. 
In addition, it claimed that other Burundian companies in which they held shares, including 
the African Bank of Commerce (ABC) had suffered expropriatory measures, including the 
seizure of documents, which paralysed ABC’s banking activities and culminated in the 
closure of the bank by police in 2000.212 
                                                     
209  Paushok, above n 206, at 694.  
 
210  Roland Klager “Case Comment: Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company, CJSC Vostokeftegaz 
Company v Mongolia” (2012) 27 ICSID Review 16 at 20.  
211 Antoine Goetz et consorts v Republic of Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3, Award, 10 February 1999.  
 
212 Kenda, above n 65, at 587.    
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Burundi counterclaimed on the basis that ABC had failed to respect the conditions of its 
operating certificate. Burundi’s counterclaims were for prejudice suffered arising form taxes 
not received and from the manner in which ABC had exercised its free zone economic 
licence allegedly resulting in unfair competition towards other banks and in market 
distortion.213 
 
The Tribunal accepted jurisdiction over the counterclaims. It also held that the 
counterclaims were connected to the principal claims, in the following terms:214 
 
In the present case, however, there can be no doubt [that there is a close connection 
between the principal claim and counterclaim]. The main dispute relating to ABC 
concerned the lawfulness of the suspension of the free enterprise zone certificate and the 
resulting closure of the bank as a result of breaches of its obligations. The counterclaim 
relates to prejudice said to have been suffered by Burundi because of those same breaches. 
It therefore relates directly to the subject matter of the dispute, and it follows that it is 
admissible. 
 
Hence, Goetz found that both the claim and counterclaim related to the conditions and actions 
carried out on the basis of the certificate and as a result there was a connection. 215 The 
counterclaims were ultimately rejected on the merits. However, it is promising that Goetz 
appears to depart from the reasoning of Saluka and Paushok in finding that there need not be 
legal symmetry of the claim and counterclaims. Nor did it shy away from counterclaims based 
on the domestic law of Burundi. Unfortunately, the tribunal’s finding that there is ‘no doubt’ 
requisite connection is satisfied offers little assistance to future tribunals. In the next Part of 
this paper, this paper proposes to supplement the tribunal’s reasoning with a recommended 
approach to requisite connection.  
 
3 INTERIM CONCLUSIONS ON REQUISITE CONNECTION 
The jurisprudence of the ICJ, the Iran/US Claims Tribunal, and contract-based arbitration is 
consistent in that, as a general rule, the existence of requisite connection between the 
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counterclaim and principal claim must be assessed in both fact and in law. However, the 
Iran/US Claims Tribunal and contract-based arbitration has interpreted legal connection 
strictly to require legal symmetry of the counterclaim and principal claim. This is 
uncontroversial in those jurisdictions: the parties can usually readily identify a contract or 
series of contracts under which the parties’ rights and obligations can be determined by 
reference to the same – national – legal order, which governs the contract as a whole.216 
 
The same cannot be said of host state counterclaims in investment treaty arbitration. Host 
state counterclaims cannot find a legal basis in the BIT or in international law to satisfy legal 
symmetry. In the treaty context, not only is the nature of the claims different; the tribunal is 
called to apply two different legal orders.217 Moreover, Saluka’s dismissal of counterclaims 
based on domestic law rests on a misreading of Amco. The unique structure of investment 
arbitration therefore requires an alternative approach.  
 
V ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO REQUISITE CONNECTION 
This paper submits that requisite connection should be determined by reference to the 
connection between the counterclaim and the investment forming the object of the principal 
claim.218 This is a legal and factual inquiry. It is a legal inquiry because the definition of 
investment is a legal concept defined by the parties, and not determined by the tribunal in fact. 
This focus on the investment rather than on symmetry of legal instruments makes more sense 
in the investment treaty context where there is not necessarily any direct legal relationship 
between the parties.219 
 
There are three other reasons why requisite connection should be established where the 
counterclaim concerns the same investment as that is implicated by the primary claim. First, it 
is a more sensible reading of broad jurisdictional clauses in BITs that confer consent over ‘all 
disputes concerning an investment’ (despite what Saluka and Paushok suggest).220 That is not 
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217   Kjos, above n 6, at 150. 
 
218  Douglas, above n 27, at 263; Atanasovaa, above n 1, at 387.  
 
219   Atansaova, above n 387. 
 
220  Douglas, above n 27, at 260.  
 
KELSEY BROOKE FARMER 
 49 
to conflate the requirements of jurisdiction and admissibility. A key difference is that a 
counterclaim cannot be based on any investment; it must be based on the same investment on 
which the principal claim is based.221 While there is a difference, closer alignment of the 
jurisdiction and admissibility requirements is reasonable in a forum largely predicated on 
party consent. As opined in SGS v Paraguay ‘having found jurisdiction, we would have to 
have very strong cause to decline to exercise it’ and it would be ‘incongruous’ to find consent 
and therefore jurisdiction yet to dismiss the claim on admissibility grounds.’222  
 
This alternative approach finds support in from the ICSID Secretariat and ICSID itself. The 
ICSID Secretariat issued the following guidance on requisite connection: 
 
… to be admissible such claims must arise “directly” out of the “subject-matter of the 
dispute” […] The test to satisfy this condition is whether the factual connection between 
the original and the ancillary claim is so close as to require the adjudication of the latter 
in order to achieve the final settlement of the dispute, the object being to dispose of all the 
grounds of dispute arising out of the same subject matter. 
 
This note does not refer to a ‘legal’ connection; rather, it emphasised the factual aspects of the 
connection required. In ICSID itself, Article 25 refers to a “legal dispute”. Argumentum a 
contrario, it would have been clearly stated in Article 46 if legal connection was a strict 
requirement.223  
 
Third, the international practice of the ICJ suggests that legal connection ought to be 
construed more as a factor for the tribunal to take into account, rather than a necessary 
prerequisite. Recalling Judge Higgins that, ‘it is not essential that the basis of jurisdiction in 
the claim and counter-claim be identical.’224 
 
                                                     
221  Atanasova, above n 1, at 387.   
 
222  SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance SA v Republic of Paraguay ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, 
Decision of Jurisdiction, at176. 
 
223   Lalive, above n 73, at 147.  
 
224  Case Concerning Oil Platforms, above n 170, (Counter-Claim Order, Separate Opinion of Judge 
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This broadening of legal connection entails that greater emphasis must be placed on factual 
connection. This paper recalls the caution of ICJ Judge Oda that too broad a definition of 
counterclaims may lead to a situation in which ‘we put what may have originally been 
somewhat distinct matters into one melting-pot without making careful examination of the 
essential character of [the] claim[s]’.225 This is an important concern. The extent to which host 
state counterclaims can improve procedural economy and the better administration of justice 
is undermined if the scope of permissible counterclaims is extended too far. So too is the 
parties’ consent to arbitration.226 The counterclaims that are admissible in any particular case 
is impossible to determine in the abstract, but this paper suggests that reference to Oil 
Platform’s ‘factual matrix’ may assist.  
 
The upshot of this alternative approach with its broader limits on legal connection is two-fold. 
First, contractual counterclaims should be admissible against both contract- and treaty- based 
principal claims, provided that the counterclaim is connected to the same investment as the 
principal claim and sufficiently factually connected to warrant consolidation of claims. The 
second is that counterclaims based on domestic law should admissible against both contract- 
and treaty- based claims (on the same provisions above). This conclusion finds support in 
scholarship:227 
 
In accordance with the terms of the contracting state parties’ consent to arbitration in the 
investment treaty, the tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione materiae may extend to counterclaims 
by the host contracting state party founded upon a contractual obligation, a tort, or a public 
act of the host contracting state party, in respect of matters directly related to the investment. 
 
It should be remembered that a counterclaim cannot be asserted unless it is admissible and the 
tribunal has jurisdiction over it. This paper proposes that a tribunal that wishes to exclude 
claims based on domestic law must do so on the basis of jurisdiction, not admissibility. This 
may be difficult to do in the face of a broad dispute resolution clause, especially where the 
treaty explicitly directs the application of host state law. A tribunal may elect to do so by 
application of the Iran/United States Claims Tribunal jurisprudence (transposed to investment 
treaty arbitration, ‘it does not arise out of investment’ but out of the operation of domestic 
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law’). It is submitted that exclusion of host state counterclaims in domestic law on this basis 
will be more difficult in the treaty context, given the “mosaic of laws” implicated in 
investment disputes.  
 
VI CONCLUSION 
 
A greater role for host state counterclaims in investment treaty arbitration has the potential to 
save host states and foreign investors the time and expense of extended battles in different 
fora over related disputes. Even in the same fora, arming both parties with the means to 
launch an offensive, rather than reserving that right for investors, may render states more 
willing to arbitrate and deter foreign investors from bringing weak claims. Investment law and 
arbitration generally would reap the benefits of a less fragmented system, and may enjoy a 
boost in legitimacy at a time where backlash against the traditional paradigm of investment as 
a mechanism for the exclusive protection of investors’ rights is becoming more pronounced.  
 
Despite these benefits, host state counterclaims are infrequently brought and never successful. 
The obstacles to host state counterclaims largely stem from the asymmetrical structure of 
investment treaties. This asymmetry is concordant with the aim of investment treaties and 
arbitration to attract foreign investment, but also has the potential to undermine the benefits 
identified. Hence, this paper proposed to navigate the obstacles that host states must contend 
with to assert counterclaims in investment treaty arbitration. 
 
In principle, the ICSID Convention and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provide that host state 
may assert counterclaims and their associated travaux préparatoires suggests that the drafters 
may have expected counterclaims to play a greater role in investment disputes. Alas, the 
availability of host state counterclaims has proven more complex in practice.  
 
The first obstacle is jurisdiction. Investment treaties extend a standing offer to foreign 
investors that, once accepted, cultimates in an arbitation agreement. This agreement 
determines the jurisdiction of the tribunal. The definition of the scope of disputes the parties 
have agreed to submit to arbitration is the most important in this respect. It will be easier for 
host states to assert counterclaims where the tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione materiae is broad, 
whether it is generic referring to ‘all disputes’ or delineates a number of legal sources such as 
authorisations and agreements. Host states cannot assert counterclaims under dispute 
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resolution clauses that limit the scope of dispute to host state obligations or the exclusive 
application of international law and/or the BIT, despite the doubt cast on this point by 
Reisman in Roussalis. Other, subsidiary, provisions of the BIT may also assist to delineate the 
scope of dipsutes. It will be easier for host states to assert counterclaims where it has locus 
standi or where the treaty explictly directs the tribunal to apply host state’s general domestic 
law – but neither are dispositive.  
 
The second obstacle is requisite connection. A survey of international jurisprudence shows a 
general trend to treat requisite connection as a matter of both fact and law. The ICJ has taken 
a flexible approach to the issue, treating both fact and law as relevant but neither 
determinative. The Iran/US Claims Tribunal and contract-based arbitral tribunals have taken a 
stricter approach, insisting on symmetry of the legal instruments that underlie the 
counterclaim and claim.  
 
Recent treaty tribunal practice in Saluka and Paushok has followed the latter approach. While 
a strict approach to legal symmetry may make sense in a commercial context, it does not 
translate to treaty arbitration since host states cannot assert counterclaims on the basis of the 
BIT. Nothing on the test of the BIT suggests that such a strict requirement is necessary. In 
addition, tribunal practice suggests that counterclaims based on domestic law are prima facie 
inadmissible. The conclusion reached is that it would be virtually impossible for states to 
assert counterclaim under the current articulation of the test for requisite connection. 
 
Accordingly, this paper proposed an alternative approach to requisite connection. Requisite 
connection should be established when the counterclaim is related the the same investment 
forming the object of the principal claim. Reference to the overall investment is broader than 
a single instrument and thus brings state counterclaims based on domestic law back into the 
fold. This paper does not venture to delineate precisely what domestic laws could form the 
legal basis of a host state counterclaim. Rather, this paper hopes to disrupt recent tribunal 
practice that is trending towards absolute exclusion of host state counterclaims, and redirect 
the inquiry away from legal symmetry and towards the essential focus of BITs: the 
investment. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
TABLE OF PUBLIC ARBITRATIONS INVOLVING STATE COUNTERCLAIMS 
(IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)228 
 
CASE NAME RULES DISPOSITION SUMMARY OF CLAIMS 
Adriano Gardella S.p.A 
v Republic of Ivory 
Coast, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/74/1, Award (Aug 
29, 1977). 
ICSID Rejected on 
merits 
Counterclaim for claimant’s failure to perform its 
contractual obligations and declaratory relief. 
Both counterclaims rejected on merits; no 
apparent discussion over counterclaims. 
S.A.R.L. Benvenuti & 
Bonfant v People’s 
Republic of the Congo, 
ICSID Case No. 
ARB/77/2, Award (Aug 
8, 1980) 
ICSID Rejected on 
merits 
Counterclaims for non-payment of duties and 
taxes arising from allegedly illegal importation, 
over-invoicing of raw materials, faults in the 
design of claimant’s plant, contractual non-
performance, and moral damages. The tribunal 
concluded that it had jurisdiction over the 
counterclaims under the parties’ agreement. The 
tribunal rejected all of the counterclaims on the 
merits.  
Klockner Industrie-
Anlagen GmbH and 
others v Republic of 
Cameroon, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/81/2, Award 
(Oct, 21, 1983) 
ICSID Rejected on 
merits  
Counterclaim for losses suffered as a result of 
failed fertilizer plant project (initial capital 
contribution, capital increases, and loans 
guaranteed by the Government), as well as moral 
damages. The tribunal held it had jurisdiction 
over the counterclaim given the direct connection 
between the parties’ contracts and the claims, but 
rejected the counterclaims on the merits.  
Atlantic Triton Company 
v People’s Revolutionary 
Republic of Guinea, 
ICSID Case No. 
ARB/84/4, Award (Apr, 
21, 1986) 
ICSID Rejected on 
merits in part, 
no jurisdiction 
in part 
Contractual and tortious counterclaims for 
damages and interest for abuse of process and 
breach of ICSID arbitration clause resulting from 
claimant’s recourse to French courts for seizure 
of vessels as security, costs of restoration and 
refit of vessels, and damages from mechanical 
breakdown of vessels and moral damages. The 
tribunal rejected the contractual claim for breach 
of the ICSID arbitration clause, the “quasi-
tortious” claim for abuse of process, and the 
claim for contractual non-performance on the 
merits. Following an objection by claimant, the 
tribunal found that the parties’ agreement did not 
grant it jurisdiction over the counterclaim for 
expenses incurred in the restoration and repair of 
the vessels. 
Amco Asia Corporation 
and others v Republic of 
Indonesia (Resubmitted 
Case), ICSID Case No. 
ARB/81/1, Decision on 
Jurisdiction (May, 10, 
1988) 
ICSID No jurisdiction Counterclaim in resubmission proceedings for 
restitution of unpaid corporate taxes and tax 
fraud. The tribunal held that it did not have 
jurisdiction over the tax fraud claim because it 
did not arise directly out of the investment. 
Indonesia had also submitted counterclaims in 
the original proceedings.  
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Maritime International 
Nominees Establishment 
(MINE) v Republic of 
Guinea, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/84/4, Final Award 
(Jan, 6, 1988). 
ICSID Partially 
rejected and 
partially 
accepted on 
merits 
Counterclaims for damages representing costs 
incurred (1) because of claimant’s wrongful 
institution of AAA instead of ICSID arbitration 
and (2) in obtaining release of attachments on 
Guinean property while improperly attempting to 
enforce the AAA award. The tribunal denied the 
first counterclaim on the merits and awarded 
reduced damages on the second counterclaim, 
which was applied as a set-off to the amounts 
awarded to claimant. 
Southern Pacific 
Properties Ltd v Arab 
Republic of Egypt, 
ICSID Case No. 
ARB/84/3, Award (May, 
20, 1992) 
ICSID Rejected on 
merits 
Counterclaim for US$30 million in damages 
arising out of the failure of a planned hotel 
project, including costs. The Tribunal found that 
claimant did not commit the faults alleged and 
dismissed the counterclaim on the merits without 
separately analysing jurisdiction.  
Franz Sedelmayer v 
Russian Federation, 
Award (July, 17, 1998) 
SCC N/A The parties disputed whether or not the 
respondent had filed a counterclaim. Respondent 
claimed that its remarks were condition on 
acceptance of jurisdiction by the tribunal and 
constituted a defence (not a separate claim); 
claimant argued that the assertion of a 
counterclaim constituted separate consent to the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction. The tribunal found it had 
jurisdiction under the treaty, but did not 
separately analyse the alleged “counterclaim.” 
Alex Genin and others v 
Republic of Estonia, 
ICSID Case No. 
ARB/99/2, Award (June, 
25, 2001) 
ICSID Rejected on 
merits 
Counterclaim for sums allegedly transferred out 
of claimants’ bank by claimant, although the 
legal basis for the counterclaim is unclear. The 
tribunal rejected the claim on the merits, 
questioning in a footnote whether the respondent 
was even the proper party to assert the 
counterclaim. 
Saluka Investments B.V. 
v Czech Republic, 
UNCITRAL, Decision 
on Jurisdiction over 
Czech Republic’s 
Counterclaim (May 7, 
2004) 
UNCITRAL No jurisdiction Counterclaims for breach of a share purchase 
agreement, violation of the Czech Commercial 
Code, wilfully providing and causing others to 
provide false, incomplete and misleading 
information, violation of “proper morality” by 
benefitting from violation of Czech law, breach 
of duties of members of bank’s supervisory 
board, and wilful breach of corporate law 
notification obligation. The tribunal found it did 
not have jurisdiction over any of the claims: the 
share purchase agreement was between different 
parties and contained a mandatory arbitration 
provision; the claims based on violation of Czech 
law fell outside the scope of the treaty.  
Patrick Mitchell v 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/99/7, Award (Feb 
9, 2004) 
ICSID Rejected on 
merits 
Counterclaim for damages for “nuisances” and 
damage to reputation of the DRC. The tribunal 
rejected the counterclaim because it found 
claimant’s claim was unjustified.  
Zeevi Holdings v UNCITRAL Partially Counterclaims for failure to invest, 
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Republic of Bulgaria 
and the Privatisation 
Agency of Bulgaria, 
UNCITRAL Case No. 
UNC39/DK, Award (Oct 
25, 2006) 
rejected and 
partially 
accepted on 
merits 
misappropriation of proceeds, bad faith, and 
breach of joint venture and investment 
agreements. The tribunal accepted certain 
counterclaims and rejected others on the merits.  
Desert Line Projects 
LLC v Republic of 
Yemen, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/17, Award (Feb 
6, 2008) 
ICSID Partially 
rejected and 
partially 
accepted on 
merits 
Counterclaim for restitution of amounts received 
under ineffective contract, and damages and/or 
set-off for the value of contractual non-
performance. The tribunal partially upheld the 
restitution claim and rejected the contractual non-
performance claim on the grounds of estoppel.  
Amco LLC v Ukraine, 
SCC Case No 080/2005. 
SCC No jurisdiction Counterclaim for damage to reputation (and 
request for costs). The tribunal rejected the 
counterclaim on the grounds that there was no 
basis in the applicable law for such a claim. 
RSM Production 
Corporation v Grenada, 
ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/14, March 13, 
2009. 
ICSID Rejected on 
merits 
Counterclaims for (1) expenses incurred in 
compensating fishermen for damage caused by 
RSM, (2) nominal damages for failure to submit 
timely application for exploration licence and (3) 
rescission of contract based on misrepresentation. 
All counterclaims rejected on merits. 
Gustav F. W. Hamester 
GmbH & Co KG v 
Republic of Ghana, 
ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/24, Award 
(June 18, 2010) 
ICSID No jurisdiction General counterclaim for damages for “losses… 
sustained as a result of [claimant’s] conduct,” 
apparently based on fraudulent conduct and 
breach of fiduciary duty in connection with a 
joint venture agreement. The tribunal rejected the 
counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction, noting that 
the losses would have been suffered by an entity 
that is not a party to the arbitration and is not an 
organ of the State.  
Sergei Paushok and 
others v Government of 
Mongolia, UNCITRAL, 
Award on Jurisdiction 
and Liability (Apr 28, 
2011) 
UNCITRAL No jurisdiction Counterclaims for unpaid “windfall profits” 
taxes; unpaid foreign worker fees; taxes, fees and 
levies evaded by illicit transfers; breach of 
licence agreements causing loss of tax revenue 
and loss of employment of Mongolian nations; 
violation of environmental obligations; damages 
for gold smuggling; and failure to comply with 
an order from the House of Lords.  
 
Counterclaims based on Mongolian domestic law 
rejected as beyond the scope of the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction. Other counterclaims rejected as 
failing to present a sufficiently close connection 
with the primary claims and relating to different 
parties. 
Spyridon Roussalis v 
Romania, ICSID Case 
No ARB/06/1, Award 
(Dec 7, 2011) 
ICSID No jurisdiction Counterclaims against claimant and his 
companies for (1) damages for breach of 
investment obligations, (2) damages for 
misappropriation of funds, (3) damages for 
breach of contractual pledge to transfer shares 
and (4) declaratory relief and damages regarding 
invalidity of resolution to increase share capital.  
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The tribunal, by a majority, found it did not have 
jurisdiction over the counterclaims because there 
was no consent to State counterclaims about 
obligations of the investor on the terms of the 
treaty.  
Antoine Goetz and 
others v Republic of 
Burundi, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/2, Award 
(June 21, 2012) 
ICSID Rejected on 
merits 
Counterclaim for damages for failure to comply 
with the conditions of an operating licence. The 
tribunal found that the counterclaim was within 
the scope of the parties’ consent and arose 
directly from the subject-matter of the dispute, 
but dismissed it on the merits.  
Occidental Petroleum 
Corp and Occidental 
Exploration and 
Production Company v 
Republic of Ecuador, 
ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/11, Award (Oct 
5, 2012) 
ICSID Rejected on 
merits 
Counterclaims for (1) abuse of process, (2) 
breach of contractual waiver of recourse to 
diplomatic channels, (3) lost production and 
property damage, (4) failure to pay assignment 
fee and failure to renegotiate a contract. The 
tribunal rejected all counterclaims on the merits, 
without discussing jurisdiction or admissibility. 
Inmaris Perestroika 
Sailing Maritime 
Services GmbH and 
others v Ukraine, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/8, 
Award (Mar 1, 2012) 
ICSID Rejected on 
merits 
Counterclaim for the cost of storing a shipping 
vessel in the winter. The tribunal found that it 
had jurisdiction over the counterclaim under the 
treaty and that the counterclaim was a component 
of the larger dispute submitted to the tribunal, but 
dismissed the counterclaim on the merits.  
Metal-Tech Ltd v 
Republic of Uzbekistan, 
ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/3, Award (Oct 
4, 2013) 
ICSID No jurisdiction Counterclaim for damages including lost profits; 
lost tax, customs and foreign exchange revenue; 
and consequential damages including increased 
unemployment, arising from claimant’s unlawful 
conduct and misrepresentations. The tribunal had 
found that there was no qualifying investment as 
the investment had been made by bribery, and 
held that there was thus no consent to arbitrate 
counterclaims relating to “non-investments”. 
Burlington Resources 
Inc v Republic of 
Ecuador, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/08.5 
ICSID N/A Ongoing. Counterclaims relating to alleged 
environmental contamination and infrastructure 
Perenco Ecudar Ltd v 
Republic of Ecuador, 
ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/6 
ICSID N/A Ongoing. Counterclaims relating to alleged 
environmental contamination and infrastructure. 
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